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Co-CoA

From Baku to Bonn: state of play and proposals

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


1. Introduction

Co-CoA “Collective Construction of Adaptation Indicators” is a regional collaborative process established in 2024 by **Argentina 1.5 and Fundación Avina**, on climate adaptation methodologies and indicators that currently involves 42 organizations from Latin America and the Caribbean with the potential to contribute to the implementation of the United Arab Emirates Framework on Global Climate Resilience and its associated Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning system. The initiative seeks to strengthen the advocacy processes towards the implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation and the operationalization of its Framework.

In 2021, the CMA3 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) established and launched the **two-year Glasgow -Sharm el Sheikh work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GlaSS)**, with a comprehensive list of eight objectives to be addressed through four workshops per year.

As a result of the GlaSS work programme, the **UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience** was established in 2023 (COP28, Dubai). This represents a significant step towards implementing the Global Goal on Adaptation and monitoring its progress, in particular through the launch of 11 targets and its linkage to the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement (art. 7.14). A **two-year Dubai-Belem work programme on indicators** was also adopted for measuring progress achieved towards the targets, including identifying existing indicators and methodologies, as well as developing new ones.






At COP29, the **Baku Adaptation Roadmap** was launched with the objective of making progress in line with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement, as well as supporting the implementation of the elements included in paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5. This paragraph requires the consideration of matters related to the GGA such as: the exchange of knowledge, experience and information; the identification of potential inputs to future global stocktakes (GST), the enhancement of understanding of the risks and impacts associated with different temperature increases across different regions; the collaboration with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and other organizations; and the terms of reference for reviewing the Framework.

A decision on the indicators associated with the UAE Framework targets including action and support, as well as on the features of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and the next steps towards the start of GST 2 in 2026 are expected towards COP30.

Additionally, adaptation under the UNFCCC in 2025 involves **other agenda items and pending issues** such as the review of the Adaptation Communication guidance, the progress of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), the Baku to Belem Roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion, the work on transformational adaptation, and the adaptation components of the first Biennial Transparency Reports and the Nationally Determined Contributions in 2025. It is key to promote coherence between these processes so as not to duplicate efforts or create additional burdens for developing countries. Rather, the entire global adaptation process, national and sub-national implementation should be geared towards meeting the targets of the UAE Framework and assessing its progress.








2. State of play: from Baku to Bonn

The COP29 decision on the UAE Framework on Global Climate Resilience provided further guidance on the UAE-Belém work programme on indicators in several areas:

- ✦ **Indicators and methodologies:** The final outcome of the programme may consist of a manageable set of no more than 100 qualitative and quantitative indicators, prioritizing outcome and output indicators for themes. These should be globally applicable to support *relevant trend analysis* while also offering a *flexible menu* that captures diverse adaptation contexts and ecosystems, allowing Parties to select relevant indicators. The outcome should also include dimensions, themes, means of implementation and cross-cutting considerations, allowing an assessment of progress towards achieving the different components of the targets. The decision outlines **criteria** for experts to consider in refining indicators, emphasizing measurability, data availability for transparent progress monitoring, ease of data collection, the use of metrics with established baselines, relevance to multiple thematic targets, and a focus on both outcomes and outputs. The decision also requested the experts to apply common approaches and methodologies, as well as enhance collaboration between the groups in the process of refining and elaborating indicators.

How can experts prioritize the reduction of the number of global indicators, keeping those that reflect overarching trends and common challenges? What does globally applicable mean? Does it refer to issues that are truly global in scale with minimal context specificity (e.g., dimensional targets) or does it also include issues that have global coverage but may not be relevant to all countries? As shared in the concept note of the workshop celebrated in March, should priority be given to selecting indicators already with data and established methodologies or





should indicators be included to drive future data collection and methodology development? Should the Parties select the most reliable indicators and ready-made data sets and/or include those with less reliability but relevant to certain ecosystems and regions?




Means of implementation: The UAE Framework explicitly references the inclusion of means of implementation. In this context, paragraph 21(g) states that qualitative and quantitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, including means of implementation are part of the UAE–Belém work programme outcome.

How can we address both enablers as a new component of the architecture without obscuring the tradition of means of implementation in negotiations? How can we avoid deadlocking negotiations on enablers and MoIs?



National Adaptation Plans: COP29 has the mandate to conclude the review of progress in formulating and implementing NAPs in developing countries. No progress could be made in the discussions, and a procedural decision was adopted. Some of the main disagreements lie in: i) an explicit commitment to increasing the resources needed to accelerate NAP implementation, addressing the gaps and needs identified by developing countries; ii) the recognition of the adaptation finance gap and the urgency of fulfilling the commitment to double adaptation finance while also reviewing this pledge; iii) an explicit reference to developed countries' obligations to scale up finance and adequate Means of implementation; and iv) defining the role of the public sector as the principal source of adaptation finance, in contrast to private sector contributions. The SBI 62 will provide resume discussions on the basis of a draft text with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the COP30.



Also, according to the GST1 outcome (paragraph 19, decision 1/CMA.5), 2025 is the year in which all parties were supposed to have NAPs in place. Some analysis of its progress and its connection to the Framework would be expected in Belém. Baku's decision affirms that NAPs are a key channel to achieving the targets.



How can the NAP process support the acceleration of target implementation? How can positive synergies be found between these two processes?



Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR): The BAR aims to make progress in line with Article 7.1 of the Paris Agreement and to support elements in paragraph 38 of decision 2/CMA.5, its modalities will be developed by the subsidiary bodies at its 62 session. A new call for submissions was extended to March 2025. 7 submissions were submitted in 2024 and 16 in 2025 by Parties. A more detailed analysis on the BAR in section 3.

How can the BAR help build bridges towards GST2? Can the BAR be the space for building capacities on aligning national and local MELs systems and the Framework? How can the BAR allow for greater coherence and synergy among the pieces and not duplicate existing efforts, agendas, and institutional arrangements?




High-level Dialogue on Adaptation: COP29 launched a Baku High-Level Dialogue on Adaptation, which will be convened alongside each COP by the COP Presidency for enhancing implementation of the Framework. The dialogue provides a chance for the highest authorities to actively engage with the adaptation agenda in the broadest sense and with the implementation of the GGA in particular.



Linkage to the GST: Baku's decision affirms that the outcome of the work programme will be a key input for the GST data collection stage, as well as for the aggregation of data from all countries. However, as stated in the BAR submissions, some parties consider the relationship between both processes is not given but should be built to a greater extent.

How does the Framework support the fulfillment of all the mandates set out in Article 7.14 of the Paris Agreement?





Transformational adaptation: A user-friendly summary of the technical paper on transformational adaptation will be prepared by the Secretariat and published by April 2025. SB62 will continue its consideration. Some developing countries have expressed doubts about the impact of this agenda on financing conditionalities.

How can the Framework help address the uncertainties and gaps associated with transformative adaptation? Can the BAR be a space for clarification in light of scientific reports, such as the IPCC?



Process: Considering the short-term, the Secretariat should prepare the report of the workshop held in Bonn no later than 6 weeks before SB62. At the same time, experts should produce their reports including the list of indicators as well as metadata and recommendations on the use of indicators no later than 4 weeks before Bonn. In the medium-term, the GGA will remain as a standing agenda item in SB64 (June 2026) and subsequent sessions. Figure 1 includes a timeline with key moments of the process in 2025.





Figure 1. UAE-Belém work programme timeline



On March 21st and 22nd a workshop under the work programme took place in Bonn, Germany, with key priority areas such as: updates since CMA 6, data readiness for indicators, interlinkages across targets and global indicators and overall trends and identified gaps and new indicators. The workshop identified the next steps in the indicator refinement process, including how to incorporate feedback from the workshop into the final indicator compilation for consideration at SB 62 and CMA7. SB 62 discussions are expected to resume the experts technical reports and the workshop summary report by the Secretariat with a view to: a) provide further guidance to the experts' work, that may be helpful to refining the final list to be discussed in a subsequent hybrid workshop; b) make progress on the scope of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap; c) consider further work on transformational adaptation.



3. Traffic light assessment on the structure of a GGA decision in COP30

The decision should provide a vision about the Framework beyond the development of indicators and the creation of new features that appear fragmentary. Thus, this decision should not be a succession of unrelated mandates. At the same time, **iteration seems to** be an essential characteristic of the UAE Framework, permitting the improvement of indicators performance over time, but also fostering **ambition**. Thus, **science** should be the basis of a process that drives future data collection and methodology development. Along with this, **equity** could be core to the process similar to the GST: supporting the development of data where it is insufficient, generating information that takes into account marginalized and vulnerable communities, indigenous peoples and gender approach, etc. and building developing countries' capacities as a way to encourage their reporting to the UAE Framework.

An incipient traffic light assessment has been elaborated based on the main elements derived from the 3/CMA.6 decision adopted in Baku. This exercise seeks to help countries and stakeholders to identify potential strategic steps and key issues for a draft decision for the conversations in the incoming workshop and formal negotiations at SB 62 in Bonn.

GREEN There is some kind of rapprochement YELLOW There is no approach yet but it is not impossible	Structure of the decision	
	Dimensional indicators	
	Thematic indicators	
	Indicators of cross-cutting	
	Enablers	











RED Still a long way off, should be assessed as to whether it is feasible	Indicators on means of implementation	
	NAPs	
	MEL Systems	
	Reporting	
	GST	
	Baku Adaptation Roadmap	
	Transformational adaptation	
	Finance provisions (Financial Mechanism, NCQG, B2B Roadmap)	
	Role of stakeholders	

Table 1. Traffic light assessment

In terms of **structure (yellow)**, Parties will have the opportunity to start conversations in June 2025, nevertheless there are minimal elements that should be present in COP30/CMA.7 as per decision 3/CMA.6. These elements should be considered together with the aspects identified in the traffic light exercise.

CMA/7 and COP30 decision' structure


1. Preambular paragraphs;
2. Recalling article 7.1, and relevant GGA related decisions;
3. References to the summary reports prepared by the
4. UNFCCC secretariat on expert's work;
5. Appreciation of the valuable contributions made
6. by the group of experts to the UAE-Belem work programme;
7. Adopt a manageable set of indicators to support the assessment of progress towards achieving the targets
8. referred to in paragraphs 9-10 of decision 2/CMA.5;
9. Adoption of the modalities for the Baku Adaptation Roadmap;
10. Conclusions resulting from the Baku high level dialogue
11. on adaptation during COP30;
12. Budgetary provisions;
13. CMA.7 Annex, containing metadata of each indicator
14. adopted (according paragraph 21 3/CMA.6), where
15. applicable: purpose; data sources; etc.





Dimensional and thematic Indicators are assessed as green, not because there is agreement on the indicators themselves, but because decisions 2/CMA.5 and 3/CMA.6 recognize that the Framework will be complemented by these types of indicators and that is the work that is taking place in the context of the work programme. There has been more debate about whether indicators for cross-cutting considerations (yellow) are part of the 100 core indicators, and even more so regarding enablers and means of implementation (yellow). However, expert reports have included proposed indicators for both cases in a strategic reading of what was agreed in Baku. It will be very difficult or even impossible to reach a common ground without indicators for means of implementation.

There is an opportunity to develop **layers of indicators**, learning from the Kumming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) but also from the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Sendai Framework. Figure 2 proposes 4 layers of indicators, where the first layer is the manageable set of 100 core indicators including dimensions, themes and means of implementation. Since not all the indicators have data sets and methodologies considered reliable, the experience of the SDGs allows to consider the opportunities to separate in tiers the indicators based on the level of methodological reliability, seeking that after a cycle, all indicators can become reliable as a process of collective capacity building. The second layer reflects the opportunities of an opt-in opt-out menu, with a horizontal disaggregation approach, by including indicators that provide greater detail on an aspect already addressed by another indicator; as well as a vertical disaggregation approach, considering local, subnational, and transboundary features of the same indicator addressed as core. The third layer could involve building relevant indicators in regional contexts in conjunction with regional organizations. Finally, the fourth layer refers to national indicators, which, perhaps due to their current relationship with the national MEL system, do not coincide with the core indicators but contribute to the collective construction of information. In any case, the concentric model seeks greater understanding and progress toward the center.



The layered model would be strengthened by the role of custodian organizations that are already working on the themes and dimensions and could support the processes of affirming datasets and methodologies, as well as building capacity with national and local MEL systems regarding the respective indicator.




Figure 2. Belem Indicators package for the UAE Framework

Mols indicators are assessed as **yellow** since Parties have different views on this issue. As mentioned in previous reports, there are several well-known adaptation finance gaps that must be monitored accordingly to align efforts in order to close them: quantity, quality, accessibility. Quantity is crucial to reduce the current adaptation finance gap of USD 187-359 billion annually, acknowledging that data on finance flows from domestic public and private sector sources is not enough (UNEP, 2024). It is also important to improve quality, since international public adaptation finance flows are still dominated by loans (62%, of which around a quarter are non-concessional) (UNEP, 2024). Moreover, there is a need to improve adaptation finance outreach to areas non typically covered along with the consideration of gender equality and social dimensions (UNEP, 2024).




On the other hand, accessibility relates to the geographic distribution (OECD, 2024), but also to the significant amount of capacity required to access them (UNFCCC SCF, 2024). The latter entails a close relationship with **enablers (yellow)** and highlights the role that factors such as leadership, institutional arrangements, policies, data and knowledge, skills and education, public participation, and strengthened and inclusive governance play to fulfill application' requirements.

NAPs are assessed as **green** because while more detailed agreement is needed on how the NAP process can be strengthened through the Framework, the Baku decision already included a paragraph recognizing NAPs as a key channel for implementation.

Although **MEL systems** have been recognized as a key dimension of the Framework and a target has been developed, building indicators and the architecture of the GGA require addressing the capacity-building and lessons-learning processes linked to the application of indicators and their integration with national planning and MEL, as well as the compatibility and adjustment exercises. While this could very well fit as a component of the BAR, it appears here separately given its strategic relevance. It has been assessed as **yellow** because this has not yet been addressed by the Parties, resulting in maximum flexibility, which, as we have seen in the case of reporting, can result in difficulties in gathering information in a short period of time.

It is important to shed light on **Parties' reporting process (green)** on the GGA targets, taking into account existing instruments under the UNFCCC, and the flexibility Parties have in choosing which instruments to use and what information to include. Decision at COP30 should establish BTRs as a primary vehicle, and invite Parties to use them to report information on the UAE Framework, but without prescribing countries to use other adaptation documents if they wish to do so. There are solid reasons to consider BTRs the most appropriate instrument: i) they follow a biennial submission timeline, ii) their preparation is guided by established guidelines that already incorporate the Framework; iii) it's already a source of input for the Global Stocktake, as per paragraph 37 of decision 19/CMA.1.





From a broader perspective, it should be considered that not only Parties can provide valuable information for assessing collective progress on adaptation. Various organizations are already working on monitoring progress, have developed indicators, and have data sets that could serve as custodians of certain indicators in the process.

The **GST (green)** is a cornerstone of the Paris Agreement's ambition cycle; therefore, the UAE Framework and its indicators should seek alignment, both to serve as a useful and effective source of information, and to better fulfill the mandate of Article 7.14. The Parties have not yet agreed on whether the full Framework with indicators will be sufficient as a primary input for compliance with Article 7.14.a. The Arab group stated its perspective in its submission to the BAR.

Regarding the **Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) (yellow)**, 16 submissions were sent by Parties in 2025 and 7 in 2024. These presents different Groups and Parties views on the BAR scope, function and outcomes. Nevertheless, the extent of convergence or divergence depends on the specific items of paragraph 38 being considered.

First, a distinction can be drawn between the submissions that took place before and after COP29, given that decision 3/CMA.6 clarified some points, such as the date for reviewing the Framework. Second, there is a strong convergence among Parties and groups who argue that, given the high fragmentation of the adaptation agenda, the BAR cannot duplicate institutional structures or arrangements but rather should make use of existing ones and help implement the Framework. However, submissions such as those from the Arab Group and Iraq are the ones that support proposals in addition to existing arrangements and activities; proposing phases where it is not clear whether the focus would be the BAR or the Framework, new technical papers, the creation of a digital platform, workshops, etc.


With regard to **item (a)** exchanging of knowledge, experience and information related to implementing the Framework, submissions address three main elements.





First, the role of relevant constituted bodies in providing technical input and expertise: the **AC** (Arab Group, Canada, Türkiye, Norway, United Kingdom, European Union, Nepal, Bhutan, Japan, Australia), **CGE** (Arab Group, Japan), **LEG** (Arab Group, Canada, LDCs, United Kingdom, Nepal, Bhutan, Japan, Australia), **SCF** (Arab Group); **NWP** (Arab Group, Canada, Norway, United Kingdom, European Union, Nepal, Bhutan, Japan, Australia), **LCIPP** (Canada), **IPCC** (Türkiye). **Second, the format to convene exchanges and gatherings.** On one hand, some Parties favored utilizing existing platforms to avoid fragmentation and duplication of work: Annual Focal Point Forum of the NWP, UNFCCC Regional Climate Weeks, NAP Expo, High-Level Champions initiatives, Adaptation Forum, Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation (LDCs, Grupo Sur, AILAC, Norway, Russian Federation, European Union, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Morocco, Uganda, Nepal, Bhutan). On the other hand, the Arab Group and Iraq proposed the establishment of new spaces for exchange. **Third, Parties expressed diverse views on the content of exchanges,** including MEL systems; water resource management; sustainable agriculture; barriers to implementation and finance. In addition, the conditions for an effective engagement on those gatherings (financial resources and regional balance), were also referenced.

Item (b) refers to the identification of potential inputs to future GST related to achieving the GGA. **Submissions emphasized the role of interested international organizations and different UNFCCC constituted bodies** in supporting Parties for the implementation of the Framework. Parties views included exploring and demonstrating how their agendas can integrate and support the GGA Framework (LDCs); refining, standardizing, and aligning relevant datasets to support aggregation and analysis at the global level (LDCs); developing detailed guidelines and providing targeted capacity-building support to developing country Parties (Grupo Sur, AILAC); standardising and summarising information for the GST (Norway, particularly AC role); developing a methodology to track the quantity and quality of financial flows aligned with the UAE Framework and carrying out an assessment of these information reported in BTRs and all relevant sources (Nepal and Bhutan, particularly the AC or SCF).





Item (c) aims to enhance the understanding of, inter alia, the risks and impacts associated with different temperature increases across regions. One of the proposals in submissions means to develop a **technical report that captures an overview of existing analyses, methodologies, and country approaches** for assessing climate risks and impacts linked to various warming scenarios –either as a dedicated technical report prepared by the Secretariat in collaboration with the IPCC (Arab Group), or as part of a broader technical report (European Union). The UK expressed that the next cycle of reporting and GST2 should already provide a better picture of climate risks across regions, suggesting that a new report may not be necessary. There was also convergence on strengthening the **NWP’ role** in synthesizing and disseminating region-specific knowledge on climate risks (LDCs, Türkiye) and on organizing dialogues during existing adaptation events (Australia).

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Parties also shared their views on **item (d)** related to the opportunities for building on the best available science, including collaboration with the IPCC to provide information for the implementation of the Framework and to identify adaptation capacity gaps, challenges and the needs of developing countries. References to the **opportunities for building on the best available** science also asked for the inclusion of the voices of vulnerable groups and rights holders such as children and youth, women and indigenous people (Norway, Türkiye, Philippines, Grupo Sur, AILAC, Canada). In this regard, Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) involvement was also mentioned (Grupo Sur, AILAC, Canada).

Regarding the **IPCCs' work**, there was convergence on leveraging the SB62 event and future opportunities to disseminate findings from AR6 and provide updates on AR7 (LDCs, Nepal, Bhutan, Türkiye, United Kingdom, EU, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Morocco and Uganda) and the review of the Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Including Indicators, Metrics and Methodologies at SB62 (United Kingdom). Moreover, specific proposals for enhancing collaboration with the IPCC were also made. The Arab Group proposed the development of two specific technical papers: an overview of all adaptation approaches with examples of their application across different contexts, and on methodologies to assess progress towards adapting to the impacts of the temperature goals of the PA. Nepal and Bhutan suggested inviting the IPCC to create a Task Force on Adaptation, similar to the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories Programme, to further develop robust and internationally agreed methodologies for measuring the UAE Framework indicators'. Iraq suggested collaborating to develop region-specific adaptation indicators and metrics; improve access to climate models and early warning systems and identify technological and financial gaps. Nevertheless, Japan suggested that indicator and methodology development should remain within the scope of the UAE–Belém Work Programme to avoid duplication.

On the topic of capacity gaps, challenges, and the needs of developing countries, views among Parties and groups varied. The Russian Federation emphasized the importance of acknowledging national and regional differences in conditions and capacities, and the need for flexibility in country-led







adaptation planning. Japan, however, noted that duplicating efforts was unnecessary, as this work is already mandated to the AC and the LEG under the NAP agenda item (decision 9/CP.27). Similarly, Australia considered the existing collaborative arrangements to be fit for purpose and supported the idea of inviting relevant bodies - such as the IPCC, NWP and AC- to continue strengthening their efforts. Türkiye highlighted that the AC is the body authorized by the CMA to focus on methodologies for assessing adaptation needs. The LDCs group stressed the importance of standardizing data to reduce reporting burdens and improve global aggregation for the GST, alongside targeted investments in capacity-building and data systems in developing countries.

Finally, regarding item (e) views largely converge on reviewing the UAE Framework after the conclusion of the second Global Stocktake, except for the Arab Group (see table 2). However, there are differing opinions on timing of the ToR development, as well the start and end dates of the review. Additionally, discussions around ToR include diverging views on the scope of the review-whether it should cover indicators, targets, or both.

WHO	WHAT	WHEN	CHALLENGES !! & OPPORTUNITIES +
Arab Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Initiate development of ToR-Start indicators review-Conclude indicators review	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-SB66 (2027)-After CMA9 (2027)-Prior to CMA10 (2028)	<p>!! There is insufficient time to adequately test the indicators. Their adoption in 2025 will allow for only two years of reporting and data collection. Depending on the final composition of the indicator package -specifically the proportion of Tier 1, 2, and 3 indicators-reliable data may not be available for all of them. Information feeding the GST might not be fully representative.</p> <p>!! Is not aligned with paragraph 38 of decision 3/CMA6. This decision already modified a previous one: paragraph 38 (e) of decision 2/CMA.5.</p> <p>+ The 2° GST will conclude in 2028. Therefore, initiating consideration of the ToR elements in 2027 may provide sufficient time to reach agreement ahead of launching the review following the conclusion of the second GST.</p>





Nepal Bhutan	-Initiate development of ToR -Review concluded	-SB 64 (2026) -CMA10 (2028)	!! Initiating the development of the ToR may be premature , as the UAE Framework and its indicators will not have undergone even a full year of testing. Additionally, there will not have been sufficient time to assess the functioning of the entire GGA monitoring system. !! Is not aligned with paragraph 38 of decision 3/CMA6 . This decision already modified a previous one: paragraph 38 (e) of decision 2/CMA.5
Türkiye Australia	-ToR concluded -Review of the Framework	-CMA10 (2028) -After 2° GST	!! Initiating the development of the ToR in 2028 may be risky if Parties fails to reach an agreement at that session, as seen with the delay of the WIM review in 2024. Such delay would postpone the start of the Framework review.
LDCs, Morocco, Burkina Faso, Chad, Kenya, Uganda, United Kingdom, European Union	-Initiate consideration of ToR -Review of the Framework	-Upon conclusion of the UAE-Belem WP -After 2° GST	!! Initiating the development of the ToR may be premature , as the UAE Framework and its indicators will not have undergone even a full year of testing. Additionally, there will not have been sufficient time to assess the functioning of the entire GGA monitoring system.
Grupo Sur AILAC United States	-Agree on structural elements of the review -Review of the Framework	-CMA7 (2025) -After 2° GST	+ !! While addressing structural elements can pave the way for ToR negotiations, it can also overburden an already full agenda . To deliver an effective indicators package to COP30/CMA7, sufficient time must be allocated for substantive discussion at SB62 and SB63
Japan	-Initiate development of ToR -Initiate review -Conclude review	-CMA9 (2027) -2029 -2031	+ The 2° GST will conclude in 2028 . Therefore, initiating consideration of the ToR elements in 2027 will provide sufficient time to reach agreement ahead of launching the review following the conclusion of the second GST. + !! Conducting the review in 2031 would allow for the assessment of both the indicators and the targets concluding in 2030. However, addressing and reaching agreement on all elements in a single session may prove overly ambitious .



Possible elements for BAR' modalities at SB62 considering parties proposals:

Scope: the BAR should focus on the implementation of the UAE Framework, whose purpose is to “guide the achievement of the global goal on adaptation and the review of overall progress in achieving it” (paragraph 7, decision 2/CMA.5).

Mandate: to advance the implementation of the UAE Framework in a complementary manner by promoting coherence in adaptation mandates -inter alia, through the integration of paragraph 38 issues into the agendas of existing UNFCCC bodies- while avoiding duplication of existing efforts and ongoing adaptation work within the current landscape of bodies and processes under the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

Timeline: it should last at least, until the completion of the first UAE Framework review, mandated after the 2 GST. Nevertheless, this should be specified by COP30. Structure based on current paragraph 38 elements:

(a) The exchange of knowledge, experience and information:

The AC and LEG with the support of CGE, LCIPP and NWP as appropriate - including non party stakeholders- to provide technical support to the Parties and recommendations associated to: **A.** the progress in implementing the targets; **B.** aligning national and local MEL systems with the Framework; and **C.** assessing annual methodological progress with custodian organizations to improve the reliability of indicators and datasets.

Efforts should also seek articulation with the High-Level Dialogues on Adaptation to capture key discussions in non-negotiated output formats (C2ES, 2025). These platforms can serve as a basis for generating recommendations to the COP and CMA, including those related to Mol needs.

The State of Adaptation Action by Parties webportal could be used to track progress made, including gaps and needs.

(b) The identification of potential inputs to future GST: The process of improving adaptation reporting and the Framework in particular will be progressive and requires capacity building. Within the BAR, compliance with the mandates established in Decision 2/CMA.5 should be monitored, such as the technical


guidance and training materials on the Framework by AC, LEG and CGE (paragraph 44), as well as the recommendations on how to improve adaptation reporting to support analysis of progress towards the targets using the agreed indicators by the AC (paragraph 45).

(c) The enhancement of understanding the risks and impacts associated with different temperature increases across different regions: encourage and promote collaboration with the AC, LEG, and NWP to integrate activities that address risks and impacts under varying temperature scenarios across regions, by synthesizing and disseminating region-specific knowledge products.

(d) The opportunities for building on the best available science, including collaboration with the IPCC: request the SBs chairs to organize every two years, in collaboration with the IPCC a special event to provide an update on the ongoing work of WGII associated with the implementation of the UAE Framework. The recommendations arising from the event will be integrated into the work of the AC and the LEG under point a.

(e) The development of ToR and time frame for the review: development of the ToR (CMA9); adoption of ToR (CMA10); midterm review of the UAE FGCR (CMA11); end of the first review of the UAE Framework (CMA13).

Format: the BAR is, by design, a roadmap -not a separate or standalone process such as a dialogue, framework, body, or work programme. It serves to enhance coherence across the existing UNFCCC adaptation landscape. In this context, activities under the BAR should be addressed by Parties under the GGA agenda item, in line with the progress of the UAE Framework's implementation and any outstanding or emerging work. Accordingly, discussions may lead to recommendations to the LEG, AC, NWP, LCIPP, CGE, SCF and other relevant constituted UNFCCC bodies to further advance the implementation of the Framework within their respective activities and mandates.






Figure 3. Timeline for the UAE Framework review


Transformational adaptation is highlighted in **yellow** because, while various groups and countries recognize its relevance alongside incremental adaptation, there are still uncertainties about its meaning and application in different regions, as well as concerns about its consequences for access to and already insufficient financing in light of needs. Furthermore, it has become a tradeoff in negotiations between groups, generating negative connotations that do not help build consensus. It is unclear if all these issues can be solved this year.

In addition to the Mol indicators, it is important that the GGA's decision in Belém incorporates **financial provisions** that link the implementation of the Framework with the NCQG and the B2B Roadmap beyond the narrative. One example is the need to promote a new adaptation finance target aligned with the cost of progressively achieving the targets. Finance provisions in the GGA decision are assessed as **yellow** given that there is still a long way to reach a common ground, including the quantum and its alignment with the targets.



Decision 1/CMA.6 established the NCQG based on the mobilization of USD 300 billion a year to developing countries by 2035 to support their climate goals. This amount decided was far from the cost needs reported by the developing countries and the High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance. In response to the demands of the developing countries, paragraph 27 of the final text launched the Baku to Belem roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion building reassurances that finance will flow to support developing countries in delivering ambitious climate action, to fill the gap between USD 300bn and \$1.3 trillion by 2035. Both commitments fell short in comparison with developing countries' needs and expectations, adding difficulties to the lack of transparency in reporting climate finance, and the adverse geopolitical circumstances affecting multilateral negotiations. Moreover, as developing countries have pointed out, access and quality of finance remain key issues for them, and the final text of the NCQG decision falls short of providing the assurance that public, grant-based finance will be provided by developed countries. The progress made in discussions before and at COP29 will need to be harnessed going forward to COP30. The Baku decision on the GGA did not address the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). However, paragraph 18 in decision 1/CMA.6 on the NCQG recognizes the need to scale up adaptation finance, including taking into account the GGA and its targets. The lack of clarity on how the NCQG does or does not address the needs associated with meeting the GGA targets is a point to consider at COP30, as well as in the B2B Roadmap to fill the adaptation finance gap.


Some of the Parties' proposals recognize that various international organizations are already assessing adaptation progress in various areas and processes that should support the Framework's implementation both in cases when the datasets are already reliable and when reliability needs to be further strengthened. However, it is assessed as **yellow** since





the role of these **stakeholders** and others such as CSOs and academia, among others, in supporting community implementation and ownership is still unclear. The NWP's partner organizations and an increasingly willing adaptation community to support countries' efforts in implementing the targets and monitoring progress should be valued.

The CoCoA process seeks to demonstrate the importance of communities in assessing the usefulness of indicators and supporting the GGA and assessing its progress with concrete actions on the ground.





4. COP30 as a Latin American and Caribbean COP and the CoCoA approach to the UAE Framework

Regional organizations play a crucial role in advancing the agenda described above. Through the Co-CoA process, which began in 2024 and continues into this year, the objective is to acknowledge and highlight the persistent barriers—such as language, limited resources, and misaligned agendas—that communities and organizations face in effectively participating in and influencing the negotiation processes under the UNFCCC. These challenges are particularly pronounced when it comes to the identification and development of methodologies and indicators to track progress on the GGA, due to the technical nature of the discussions.

Against this backdrop, it is essential to foster flexible and collaborative pathways among regional organizations, enabling the inclusion of diverse voices, perspectives, and knowledge systems. This approach seeks to ensure that such contributions are meaningfully reflected in the outcomes of the UAE-Belém Work Programme leading up to COP30.

Some key reflections that emerged from 2024 initiatives organized under CoCoA (Argentina 1.5 and Fundación Avina in December, 2024) with regard to the methodological work underscore:



A high level of uncertainty around measuring and monitoring the wide range of adaptation indicators.



Lack of clear differentiation between qualitative and quantitative indicators, as well as insufficient recognition of the impacts on the most vulnerable populations.




✦ Regarding the number of indicators, the organizations emphasized the **importance of building on existing experiences**, such as those developed under the SDGs.


Considering the regional context, some topics were highlighted that required additional discussion during the UAE Framework implementation, such as the role of older adults that are often overlooked as a vulnerable group, despite being among those most affected by the adverse impacts of climate change; and mapping of indicators on work-related migration remains underrepresented.

In conclusion, the lessons learned from the Co-CoA process throughout 2024 underscored the need to intensify efforts to strengthen advocacy so that communities can actively contribute to climate responses. At the same time, it remains essential to continue fostering collaborative approaches across the region. The unity of LAC countries will be crucial in the process of operationalizing the UAE Framework, ensuring that it is not used to justify unequal allocation of resources or suggest that some countries are more deserving than others.


Ahead COP30, a Latin America and the Caribbean perspective on adaptation results could consider elements such as those expressed on a letter (Politica Por Inteiro, 2025) to the COP30 President, Ambassador André Corrêa do Lago, in occasion of the event titled “Adaptation as a Priority for COP30”:

✦ **CMA7 should adopt the final set of indicators** for the operationalization of the UAE Framework and integrate **Mol as a core element**. The package should incorporate **cross-cutting issues** such as gender, racial and ethnic perspectives, Afro-descendant populations, persons with disabilities, Indigenous peoples, traditional and local communities, human rights, children and youth, and migrants.





- ✦ **Ensure regional balance for activities promoted by the Baku Adaptation Road Map.** LAC should clearly identify region-specific priorities and challenges and enhance coordination through regional forums to join the efforts of the BAR process.
- ✦ In order **to achieve the GGA, financing must be needs-based and clearly reflected and tracked within the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T.** This roadmap should, in turn, establish a new quantitative target for adaptation finance to replace the goal set by the Glasgow Climate Pact—specifically, advocating for a NCQG of \$300 billion in public funding for adaptation. **The private sector role** in adaptation must be acknowledged and incorporated into the Roadmap, which should also include qualitative measures aimed at improving the quality of finance and equitable access to it.
- ✦ The **GGA and the B2B roadmap should explicitly link adaptation finance to the achievement of the 11 targets** outlined in the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience.
- ✦ **All developing countries should be equally considered, without introducing comparisons of vulnerability in adaptation.** To this end, having a common set of indicators for all Parties would be crucial to achieving a global understanding of inequalities.
- ✦ It is crucial to **initiate a dialogue on monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) systems and mechanisms for these indicators**, ensuring that Parties have the necessary means of implementation to track their progress, using consistent criteria and a common language.





The Group SUR and AILAC have been able to agree on adaptation in most of the sessions and presented several submissions¹ since the GlaSS, even in times of structural political differences. The submission made recently on the BAR is a new positive precedent. Organizations in the region can support this process, jointly promoting a Latin American and Caribbean perspective on the COP and its outcome.

In this context, Ambassador Corrêa do Lago released his first letter (COP30, 10/3/2025) in March, emphasizing that this year should serve as a pivotal moment for advancing climate adaptation and the submission of NAPs. He stressed that adaptation must be given the same level of commitment and central importance as mitigation. This signals a timely and strategic opportunity to continue fostering spaces for dialogue that can drive the adaptation agenda forward and lead to tangible outcomes.

1.

2022: ABU-AILAC (august)

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202208111545---Submission%20AILAC%20ABU%202nd%20workshop%20of%20the%20GlaSS%20work%20programme%20on%20the%20GGA.pdf> ;

ABU-AILAC (september)

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202209221412---Submission%20AILAC%20ABU%203rd%20workshop%20GlaSS.pdf>

2023: ABU-AILAC (may)

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202305162235---Submission%20by%20Argentina%20on%20behalf%20of%20ABU%20-%20AILAC.pdf>

ABU, AILAC and LMDC (july-august)


https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202307211406---Argentina_s%20submission%20on%20behalf%20of%20ABU,%20AILAC%20and%20LMDC_proposal%20for%20agenda_7%20workshop.pdf

ABU-AILAC (november)

https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202311252210---Final_ABU-AILAC%20Submission%20on%20the%20GlaSS.pdf

2024: AILAC (august)

<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/SubmissionsStaging/Documents/202408271639---20240826%20AILAC%20Submission%20on%20GGA%20Indicators%20ARG%20VF%20consolidado.pdf>





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