

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Co-CoA

Assessing adaptation in Latin America's first BTRs: linkages with the Global Goal on Adaptation and the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience

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Co-CoA

Assessing adaptation in Latin America's first BTRs: linkages with the Global Goal on Adaptation and the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience

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Key findings of this report

- 19 Latin American Countries (LAC) submitted a first BTR (BTR1) to the UNFCCC between 2024 and 2025.
- 15 out of 19 BTR1 of LAC are aligned with the ETF MPGs in structure and content.
- 16 BTR1 of LAC countries included loss and damage components, separately (5) or together with adaptation (11).
- 11 BTR1 of LAC included references to the GGA and 6 to the UAE-FGCR. Of this number, 5 countries showed a high level of integration of the GGA and the UAE-FGCR to the BTR1.
- 11 out of 19 BTR1 of LAC demonstrated moderate evidence of gender mainstreaming.
- 1 country showed a high level and 5 countries a moderate level of integration of Indigenous People´s Knowledge and Local Knowledge.

- More than a half of submitted BTR1 show clear evidence of inclusive and participatory adaptation planning processes.
- 17 LAC have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities.
- 14 LAC BTR1 referred to Early Warning Systems in their countries.
- 12 LAC BTR1 reported progress on establishing climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.

- 13 LAC have a NAP and 5 more have other national adaptation instruments, such as NDC with adaptation components, climate change policies and strategies.
- 13 LAC reported in BTR1 the approval of regulatory frameworks for adaptation. A certain predisposition has been found among countries with legal frameworks for developing NAPs. This is not a precondition, nor does it apply in all cases, but it is a trend.
- Mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into national or sectoral development plans in LAC is uneven across countries, but at least 13 BTR1 showed high or moderate integration.

- The costing of adaptation actions remains challenging for LAC, with 4 countries showing moderate evidence of cost analysis for all adaptation measures, and 5 countries reporting the costs for a limited number of adaptation measures. Measuring the costs of adaptation actions may require a clearer definition of the methodologies to be used and greater clarity in how the information is presented, which could also lead to increasing the reporting burden.
- All LAC with adaptation components of BTR1 reported receiving support for adaptation planning, and 13 countries reported receiving international public finance for adaptation.
- 7 LAC provided evidence of progress in implementing their adaptation instruments.
- 11 LAC have designed and begun operationalising Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEl) systems.
- Progress associated with the institutional capacities needed to implement MEL systems is uneven across LAC. However, at least 7 countries reported high or moderate evidence of institutional capacity to operate MEl systems.

Key considerations for GST2

1.The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean continue to show their leadership in the process of elevating the profile of adaptation globally, by accelerating the fulfillment of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and the United Arab Emirates Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE-FGCR).

2. For the purpose of reviewing progress in achieving the GGA, in light of the UAE-FGCR, it will be crucial to understand that analyzing all adaptation documents by a single institution, such as the UNFCCC Secretariat, may require significant resources, resulting in less comprehensive assessments. Countries can leverage BTR2 to include information on progress toward the UAE-FGCR targets and GGA components to reduce the fragmentation of the collection and analysis effort.

3. While the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries have made many cross-references between adaptation documents, which facilitates information retrieval and helps understand that in many cases not all information is repeated or mentioned in the BTR since it is in NAPs or other documents, it is important that the cross-references be even clearer and more comprehensive, including more than just a title. This will also facilitate the evaluation of collective progress.



4. The UAE-FGCR is a key tool for assessing progress towards achieving the GGA. While there may currently be doubts about the status of the indicators, the policy alignment process that will take place up to Addis Ababa and will coincide with the first years of GST2 could be used to generate a collective learning process based on how countries report—especially in their BTRs—their progress vis-à-vis the targets, using—or not—the Belem Adaptation Indicators.

5. This paper found that the change in the language of the indicators from the experts' proposal to the one adopted in Belem may have hindered the generation of global metrics, as the current language is less clear and direct in its application, some of the new indicators may require greater reporting burdens, and the language introductions resulted in the need for greater interpretation of information when assessing levels of establishment, extent and depth of usage, among others, making it harder to standardise and aggregate at the global level.

1. Introducción

This technical paper aims to contribute to the international process under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement (AP), to operationalise the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and its UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE-FGCR), including its 11 targets.

In this regard, the report seeks to build coherence and articulation between the UAE-FGCR and the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF). In particular, the process of voluntary submissions of adaptation information in the Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) allows the inclusion of information on the GGA.

It should be highlighted that paragraph 12 of the COP30/CMA.7 decision held in Belém, Brazil, invites Parties to integrate the Framework's targets and the Belém Adaptation Indicators (BAIs) into their reporting and planning processes, including BTR, adaptation communications, national adaptation plans, nationally determined contributions and national communications.

The scope of this technical paper is limited to Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries that submitted their first BTR during 2024 and 2025. The analysis examines whether and how LAC countries report on adaptation in general, and on the GGA and UAE Framework targets, in particular, with special emphasis on the adaptation policy cycle (APC) and the cross-cutting considerations. This assessment draws on the May and September versions of the indicators developed by experts. Also, it assesses the results of CMA.7, which adopted a set of 59 indicators to track the eleven targets comprising the Framework.

The current technical paper is part of the Co-CoA “Collective Construction of Adaptation Indicators” regional collaborative process established in 2024 by Argentina 1.5 and Fundación Avina. The project addresses climate adaptation methodologies and indicators, involving 42 organisations from Latin America and the Caribbean to support the implementation of the UAE FGCR and its associated Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning system.

In terms of the structure of this paper, the second section focuses on the methodology applied and expanded in the Annex. Section 3 presents a comparative analysis of the indicators developed in this report to assess the information reported by Parties in their BTRs in this report, vis a vis those adopted as part of the Belem Adaptation Indicators (BAIs) package and the experts' lists. A justification of the decision to use BAI or not is also provided in Table 1.

Section 4 analyses adaptation information included by Parties as an adaptation component, chapter, or section in the BTR. As part of the analysis, it is sought to determine whether countries followed the MPGs when reporting on adaptation, and whether adaptation and loss and damage information is compiled together, among other aspects. See Table 1. Introduction to an adaptation component of the BTR in the Annex. Methodological guidelines.

Finally, and also in section 4, the analysis is focused on the GGA, the UAE-FGCR, and the cross-cutting considerations, specifically, gender, indigenous peoples, and participatory and transparent processes. A deep dive into the four dimensions of the APC is also integrated. See Table 2. The UAE-FGCR in BTRs in the Annex. Methodological guidelines.

2. Methodology

The document applies a qualitative analysis of the BTRs submitted by 19 LAC countries between 2024 and 2025. The objective is to analyse how countries report on adaptation and to what extent these reports contribute to achieving the GGA and its UAE-FGCR. Therefore, this technical paper seeks to contribute to the second Global Stocktake that will begin in 2026, where progress in achieving the GGA in line with article 7.14.d of the Paris Agreement is expected to be reviewed.

The sources of information are the submitted BTRs and cross-referenced national documents provided by the Parties, such as National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), Adaptation Communications (AdComs), sectoral adaptation strategies or plans, and previous reports (e.g., BURs or National Communications).

The analysis focuses on the content and structure of the BTRs, prioritising consistency, coherence, and the level of detail in adaptation reporting in relation to the Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPGs) of the ETF referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and established in Decision 18/CMA.1.

3. Comparative assessment of the Belém Adaptation Indicators, the experts´ lists and the CoCoA indicators

In 2023, COP28 adopted the UAE-FGCR to guide the achievement of the GGA and review its progress, including action and support. The UAE-GGCR decision includes 11 targets and the launch of a two-year work programme on indicators.

Some months later, SB60 conclusions (2024) produced two concrete mandates. First, a **submission call** by 31 July 2024 to present information on existing indicators in use at the local, national, regional and global level, including, if available, information on associated methodologies and data readiness for such indicators, as well as identified gaps and areas for which the development of new indicators may be needed, mapped and compiled by the Adaptation Committee. Second, it agreed to **convene technical experts** to assist in the technical work under the UAE-FGCR, including reviewing and refining the compilation and mapping of existing indicators and, as needed, developing new indicators.

COP29 in 2024 acknowledged the significant progress made by the experts on indicators and noted the time constraints in delivering the refined mapping of indicators before the CMA6. It also recognised that further guidance was required, and invited experts to prepare a consolidated list of indicator options and a progress report.

In 2025, 78 experts worldwide produced an initial list of 490 indicators published on May 22nd. Later, SB62 agreed to refine the criterion for experts to provide a final list that fulfils the mandate of CMA6, consisting of a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators. Based on this, a second and final list of 100 indicators was published on September 8th.

Recently, during COP30 held in Belem, Parties gathered to finalise the work programme on indicators with the September expert list as the basis for adopting a decision. The negotiations revealed that the parties held very different views on the indicators and provisions that should accompany their adoption. In fact, the possibility of adopting a list was debated until the very end of the COP. The lack of consensus evident in the final COP plenary session regarding this decision demonstrates that both the **process** by which a final draft was reached and its **contents** were not acceptable for some Parties, as they felt they had not been taken into account during the second week of negotiations. The list of 59 indicators adopted is not a streamlined or slightly adjusted version of the 100, but represents a substantive change in the balance of the package and in the language of the indicators. In substance, the list contains serious inconsistencies and ambiguities in its wording, which compromise its implementation. At the same time, and on a positive note, the decision explicitly mentioned cross-cutting considerations and the need for disaggregated data for people of African descent, indigenous peoples, local communities, children, youth, and migrants. Moreover, it reaffirmed that these indicators will not be conditional or prescriptive for access to adaptation financing.

Concerning means of implementation, indicators recognise the role of public financing for developing countries and were developed in line with the agreed language of the MPGs. Nevertheless, paragraph 8 states that the BAIs do not create new financial obligations or commitments for developed countries, nor do they generate liability or compensation. This creates a negative precedent when negotiating finance for the implementation of the indicators, which are key to achieving the GGA and the UAE-FGCR. Secondly, the text introduces the concepts of liability and compensation in the context of adaptation, possibly seeking to prevent a scenario in which the UAE-FGCR ends up calculating the costs of adaptation and creating a very dangerous and new precedent that was not negotiated.

The objection by several Parties and groupings to this decision at the final plenary put the BAIs in a blurred situation, including the legitimacy of the process and its content, as well as questioning the future of the implementation of the UAE-FGCR.

Taking into account this technical and political background, Table 1 presents both CoCoA and BAI indicators. CoCoA indicators were developed drawing on the May and September experts' indicator lists (as specified in Tables 1 and 2 of the Annex), and, in a few cases, new indicators were designed to address relevant variables for this BTR assessment. Moreover, this section explains the reasons for choosing one indicator over another.

Table 1. *The use of Belem Adaptation Indicators and CoCoA indicators in this report*

Section	CoCoA indicators	Experts Lists (May and September 2025)	Belem Adaptation Indicators (CMA7)	Justification
2.1. Reference to the GGA and/or the UAE-FGCR	*2.1.1. Number of Parties that include references to the GGA (analysis only indicator)* *2.1.2. Number of Parties that include references to the UAE-FGCR (analysis only indicator)* *2.1.3. Level of reference by country, region (low, moderate, high) (analysis only indicator)*	Not included	Not included	These indicators were developed for this specific report and were not based on the experts' indicators list. They have been designed to provide an overall picture of Parties' use and reference to the GGA and its Framework.
2.2. Cross-cutting considerations. Gender	2.2.1 Number of Parties that have in place gender-responsive adaptation plans that: (a) integrate	Sept10.b.04. Number of Parties that have in place gender-responsive adaptation plans, policy instruments,	Paragraph 11 (b) of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the planning dimension: Status of having gender-responsive	This report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (Sept version). The reason lies in its greater

	gender disaggregated data and gender analysis for the Impact Vulnerability and Risks Assessment processes (IVRAs); (b) include gender-specific outcomes; (c) include gender-specific indicators in the monitoring framework.	and planning processes and/or strategies	adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies in place.	comprehensiveness and detail about what a gender-responsive adaptation process entails.
2.3. Cross-cutting considerations. Indigenous Peoples.	2.3.1 Proportion of National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems integrated in (a) IVRAs, (b) MEL systems, and (c) specific outcomes and impacts derived from implementation.	Sept10.b.05. Proportion of National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems	Paragraph 11 (c) of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the planning dimension: Existence of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, planning processes, and strategies that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples and local knowledge systems.	This report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (Sept version). The reason lies in its comprehensiveness to measure progress, showing the degree to which traditional, Indigenous Peoples', and local knowledge systems are integrated across adaptation plans, policy instruments, IVRAs, MEL systems, and implementation outcomes. Moreover, it allows tracking proportional change over time, identifying gaps, and assessing the quality and depth of integration.
2.4. Cross-cutting considerations. Participatory and transparent processes	2.4.1 Number of Parties that have developed their NAP/policy instrument in an inclusive and participatory process and reported to have documented engagement of subnational actors, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, civil society, and vulnerable groups.	May10.b.1.f. Number of Parties that have developed their NAP/policy instrument in an inclusive and participatory process, with documented engagement of subnational actors, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, civil society and vulnerable groups.	Not included	This report retains the indicator developed using the May 2025 experts' list as its basis, as the Belém Adaptation Indicators list does not include related ones.

2.5. APC 1. Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment (by subcomponent)	2.5.1. *Number of Parties that have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities.*	May.10.a.01. Number of Parties that have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities.	Paragraph 10 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the IVRA dimension: (b) Level of conduct of assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts, and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities based on different global warming scenarios, as appropriate for regions and contexts;	This report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (May version). The indicator from the Belem decision implies the elaboration of a level of IVRAs implementation, based on different global warming scenarios. The latter is difficult to achieve, since standardising this type of information at the global level for aggregation does not seem feasible.
	2.5.2. *Number of Parties that have used up-to-date climate risk information and comprehensive risk assessment to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.*	Sept10.a.09. Number of Parties that have used up-to-date climate risk information and comprehensive risk assessment to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.	Paragraph 10 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the IVRA dimension: (g) Extent of usage of climate risk information and comprehensive risk assessment based on different global warming scenarios, as appropriate for regions and contexts, to inform formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.	This report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (Sept version). While both indicators capture the use of climate risk information in adaptation planning, 2.5.2 focuses on counting Parties that use such information, providing a simple and globally comparable metric. BAI, however, assesses the extent and depth of usage, including whether Parties apply risk assessments based on global warming scenarios, which makes it harder to standardise and aggregate at the global level.
	2.5.3.*Number of Parties that have established multi-hazard early warning systems.*	Sept10.a.01. Number of Parties that have established multi-hazard early warning systems.	Paragraph 10 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the IVRA dimension: (a) Level of establishment of multi-hazard early warning systems; (c) Level of establishment of	This report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (Sept version). BAI para 10(a) and 10(c) are not assessed in this report since they require assessing the level of establishment. The use of the September version is associated with 3

			multi-hazard monitoring and impact-based forecasting systems, including monitoring stations;	reasons: a. improving clarity, b. reducing reporting burden, c. minimising the need for subjective judgment or interpretation by the reviewer since the level of establishment requires scoring across multiple dimensions (e.g., risk knowledge, monitoring, dissemination, response capability).
	2.5.4. *Number of Parties that have established climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.*	Sept10.a.08.Number of Parties that have established climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.	Paragraph 10 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the IVRA dimension: (f) Level of establishment of climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services;	This report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (Sept version). The arguments provided to use the expert's version over the BAI version in paragraph 10(f) are the same for paragraphs 10(a) and 10(c) of BAI.
		Sept10.a.04. Number of people per 100,000 that are covered by early warning information through local governments or through national dissemination mechanisms. Sept10.a.07.Percentage of population in a county exposed to or at risk from climate-related disasters protected through pre-emptive evacuation following early.	Paragraph 10 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the IVRA dimension: (d) Number of people per 100,000 that are covered by early warning information through local governments or through national dissemination mechanisms; (e) Percentage of the population in a country exposed to or at risk from climate-related disasters protected through pre-emptive evacuation measures following early warning;	These indicators were not included in this technical report, and this type of information was not included in the first round of BTRs either.

2.6. APC 2. Planning (by subcomponent)	*2.6.1. Number of Parties with adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.*	Sept10.b.01.Number of Parties with adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.	Paragraph 11 (a) of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the planning dimension: *(a) Status of having national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies in place;*	In the case of 11(a), this report retains the indicator developed using the experts' list as its basis (Sept version). Some arguments that explain the selection are: focus on political commitment using the word "adopted", binary and simple to measure, less reporting burden, alignment with the target that prioritises that all countries have NAPs in place and avoiding a granular assessment on its quality or maturity that seems difficult to evaluate and aggregate.
	2.6.2. Number of Parties that have adopted national legislation or other legislative frameworks on adaptation.	Sept10.b.02. Number of Parties that have adopted national legislation or other legislative frameworks on adaptation.	Not included	This report retains the indicators developed based on the experts' lists (in some cases May and in other Sept), as the Belém Adaptation Indicators list does not include related ones.
	2.6.3. Proportion of countries integrating climate change adaptation into national (and sectoral) development plans by undertaking: (a) IVRAs; (b) adaptation measures; (c) MEL elements and (d) budget allocation.	May10.b.04. Proportion of countries integrating climate change adaptation into national (and sectoral) development plans.	Not included	In 2.6.3. an indicator from the May 22 version has been used, as it captures different dimensions of adaptation mainstreaming. and 3 elements have been added to assess mainstreaming. The indicators suggested in the September 9 version refer to the integration of climate risks into public investments and public procurement, as well as adaptation budgets, which, in our view, do not necessarily indicate mainstreaming.
	MoIs *2.6.4. Number of Parties where cost estimates for implementation of the NAP/Policy instrument are available.*	May10.b.01. Number of Parties where cost estimates for implementation of the NAP/Policy instrument are available including reference to	Not included	In 2.6.4. an indicator from the May 22 version has been used since it is not included in the September version or in the BAI.

	sources of finance (domestic and international)		
MoIs *2.6.5. Costs of adaptation actions identified in adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.*	Sep10.c.05.Costs of adaptation actions identified in adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.	Not included	In 2.6.4. an indicator from the September version has been used since it is not included in the BAI.
MoIs *2.6.6. Number of Parties receiving or providing and mobilizing international support for formulation of National Adaptation*	Sept10.b.03. Number of Parties receiving or mobilising international support for formulation of National Adaptation Plans, policy	Not included	The September version is applicable since BAI does not include indicators to assess support for preparing NAPs.

	Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, including for capacity development.	instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, including for capacity development.		
2.7. APC3. Implementation	*2.7.1.* (a) Extent of implementation of national adaptation plans, policies and strategies.	Sept10.c.01. Degree of implementation of national adaptation plans, policies and strategies.	Paragraph 12 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the implementation dimension: (a) Extent of implementation of national adaptation plans, policies and strategies relative to planned implementation thereof;	The report aligns with the BAI version, since there is some similarity between degree and extent, both of which quantify progress along a continuum (from none to full) and can be expressed using percentages, scales, or qualitative levels, which allows for this alignment. However, the last part is not considered since it would require a comparison with planning, which is not part of the methodology in this report.
		Sept10.c.02.Number of deaths and missing persons associated with climate-related hazards, per 100,000 population.	Paragraph 12 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the implementation dimension: (b) Number of deaths and missing persons associated with climate-related hazards, per 100,000 people, including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable;	The indicator was not included in this technical report.
		Sept10.c.04. Direct economic loss associated with climate-related hazards as a proportion of gross domestic product.	Paragraph 12 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the implementation dimension: (c) Net savings as a percentage of gross domestic product from avoided losses, including as an outcome of adaptation actions where applicable;	The indicator was not included in this technical report.

MoIs *2.7.2. Amount of international public finance for climate adaptation provided by developed countries and received by developing countries for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments and planning processes and/or strategies per [time frame]*	10.c.06.[Option 2] Amount of international public finance for climate adaptation provided, and received for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments and planning processes and/or strategies per [time frame].	Paragraph 12 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the implementation dimension: (d) Amount of finance for climate adaptation reported in line with chapters IV, V and VI, as relevant and as appropriate, of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, disaggregated by the parameters listed in paragraphs 123, 125, 133 and 134, as applicable, of the same decision, which includes the amount of international public finance for climate adaptation provided by developed countries and received by developing countries for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies;	Indicator 2.7.2 is the same as one of the options in September's version and is part of the BAI text. Although the formulation of the BAI coincides with the spirit of Bueno Rubial et. al (2025) prepared prior to the workshop of September 2025, in this analysis, it is more feasible to focus only on this part. A new report assessing the second round of BTRs can address information disaggregated by the parameters listed in paragraphs 123, 125, 133 and 134 of Decision 18/CMA.1.
	Not included.	Paragraph 12 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the implementation dimension: (e) Technology development and transfer for climate adaptation reported in line with chapters IV, V and VI, as relevant and as appropriate, of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, disaggregated by the parameters listed in paragraphs 127, 136 and 138, as applicable, of the same decision, which includes technology development and transfer support for	The report does not include an assessment of these elements, but could be considered for a new report assessing the second round of BTRs. The September version included 2 options associated with the implementation of TNAs, NAPs, NDCs and other equivalent instruments on technology needs. The BAI text is more aligned with the proposal in Bueno Rubial et. al (2025).

			transfer support for climate adaptation provided by developed countries and needed and received by developing countries for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies;	
		Not included	(f) Capacity-building for climate adaptation reported in line with chapters IV, V and VI, as relevant and as appropriate, of the annex to decision 18/CMA.1, disaggregated by the parameters listed in paragraphs 129, 140 and 142, as applicable, of the same decision, which includes capacity-building support for climate adaptation provided by developed countries and needed and received by developing countries for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.	The report does not include an assessment of these elements, but could be considered for a new report assessing the second round of BTRs. The September version included 2 options associated with the implementation of TNAs, NAPs, NDCs and other equivalent instruments on technology needs. The BAI text is more aligned with the proposal in Bueno Rubial et. al (2025).
2.8. APC4. MEL	2.8.1. *Number of Parties that have designed and/or operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts.*	Sept10.d.01. Number of Parties that have designed a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts. Sept10.d.02.Number of Parties that have operationalised a	Paragraph 13 of the Annex to Decision CMA/7, under the MEL dimension: (a) Extent of design of a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for national adaptation efforts relative to needs; (b) Level of	This report retains indicators developed using the Sept experts' list as its basis. The arguments are the ones provided for paragraphs 10(a), (c), and (f) of Belem decision and 2.5.3 and 2.5.4 of this report.

		system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts	(b) Level of operationalization of a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for national adaptation efforts;	
	Not included	Sept10.d.03. Number of Parties that periodically publish adequately detailed MEL findings of the implementation of their national adaptation efforts.	(c) Level of periodic publication of monitoring, evaluation and learning findings regarding the implementation of national adaptation efforts;	The report does not include an assessment of these elements, but could be considered for a new report assessing the second round of BTRs.
	Not included	Sept10.d.04. Level of integration of MEL system findings into relevant plans, policies, processes, legal frameworks, and budgets	(d) Level of integration of monitoring, evaluation and learning system findings into national adaptation efforts;	The report does not include an assessment of these elements, but could be considered for a new report assessing the second round of BTRs.
	2.8.2. Number of Parties with sufficient institutional capacity, including adequate financial resources to fully operate the national adaptation MEL system.	Sept10.d.05. Number of Parties with sufficient institutional capacity, including adequate financial resources, to fully operate the national adaptation MEL system.	(e) Level of institutional capacity to fully operate systems for monitoring, evaluation and learning for national adaptation efforts.	This report retains the indicator developed by the experts in September. The arguments are the ones provided for paragraphs 10(a), (c), and (f), as well as paragraphs 13 (a) and (b) of Belem decision and 2.5.3, 2.5.4 and 2.8 of this report.

4. Findings from the BTR analysis

4.1. Structure and content of BTR adaptation components

Of the 19 BTRs submitted by LAC countries, only two (Trinidad and Tobago and Guatemala) did not include an adaptation component or section. The majority (15) aligned them with the structure and content, included in Section IV of the MPGs, incorporating at least 5 of the headings or elements, whether or not in order.

It is important to note that, among the Parties that aligned their BTRs with the MPGs, several approaches to applying the MPGs were used. Some reported information for each subitem under the paragraph. When they did not have information to report, they referred to the corresponding section, which included similar relevant information. Others chose to group information by merging different subparagraphs; in some cases, they made the reason explicit (e.g., overlapping), and in others, they did not justify their grouping.

This allows identification of **key takeaways** to be carried forward to improve reporting for the second round of BTRs:

Key takeaways to improve reporting towards BTRs2

- Seeking alignment with the MPGs structure will permit assessing reporting improvement within the country;

- Clustering information when the Party understands that it overlaps with other headings is helpful to present data in a more articulated and fluent way. It can also inform future adjustments of MPGs at the UNFCCC, as well as voluntary review processes. However, Parties may consider clarifying when clustering has been applied and the reasons behind the decision. Clarifications are not only useful for international negotiations but also for national teams that may change from one report to another.

- Using cross-references to other relevant adaptation documents can be further developed by the Parties, as it contributes to enhancing coherence and articulation among several adaptation policy instruments. When cross-referencing, it is helpful to provide a brief explanation of the sections' content rather than just the name of the adaptation document.

Regarding the inclusion of **loss and damage information**, five countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, Guyana, and Honduras) presented it in a standalone chapter. Meanwhile, the majority (11) of the LAC countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela) chose to report L&D in the adaptation chapter. There is one case, Belize, that made a general mention of losses and damage in the context of the "Coastal Zone and Marine Resources" and "Tourism" country's NDC adaptation targets. Three countries did not include either adaptation or loss and damage information in their BTRs.

Concerning this, being the first reporting exercise on loss and damage, it will be helpful for Parties to consider reporting separately on L&D, whether it is in a specific section within the adaptation chapter (as indicated in the MPGs) or in a standalone chapter. Including separate information on L&D will contribute to global efforts to understand how the adaptation, loss, and damage continuum articulates in practice, as well as to enhance more coordinated action.

Table 2. Snapshot of the first LAC countries' BTRs submissions

Number of LAC countries that submitted a first BTR (Jan 2024 to July 2025)	19
Number of Parties that submitted their first BTR in 2024	17
Number of Parties that submitted their first BTR in 2025	2
Number of Parties with an adaptation component in their first BTR	17
Number of Parties with a Loss and Damage component in their first BTR	17
Number of Parties with a Loss and Damage component in their first BTR included in the adaptation section	11
Number of Parties with a Loss and Damage component in their first BTR as a standalone section	5
L&D is integrated in the BTR (any form)	1
Number of Parties with an adaptation component in their first BTRs aligned with MPGs	15

4.2. References to the GGA and the UAE-FGCR

As Bueno Rubial et al. (2025) noted in the 5th technical paper on the GGA, BTRs are the best-positioned instruments for reporting progress in implementing the UAE-FGCR, given that the MPGs already incorporate the GGA (p. 26). In this sense, 11 out of 17 LAC Parties that submitted a BTR with an adaptation component took advantage of this and included references to the GGA (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay) but few (only 6) referred to the UAE-FGCR (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Honduras). On the level of inclusion of the UAE-FCGR, only a few (7) established linkages with the three GGA components (reduce vulnerability, enhance adaptive capacity, and strengthen resilience) or with the UAE-FGCR targets.

Regarding the latter, five countries (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Honduras) demonstrated a **high level of inclusion of the GGA and the UAE-FCGR**. This means the GGA components are clearly stated, and that the progress of adaptation actions in the country is linked to them, as well as to the UAE-FGCR

and its targets, and to how the progress of adaptation actions in the country contributes to the progress of the targets. There is one country (Brazil) that did a **moderate inclusion**: Brazil aims to align its MEL system, targets, and indicators with Decision 2/CMA.5 and the UAE Framework, as reflected in the ongoing NAP review. There is one country (Uruguay) that did a **high level of inclusion of the GGA only**: Uruguay carried out a qualitative assessment of the potential contribution of the adaptation measures proposed in both the Second Adaptation Communication and the first, when implemented, taking into account the concepts, qualities and characteristics of each of the components of the GGA. There are four other countries (Costa Rica, Peru, Mexico and Paraguay) showing **low alignment**, as they include a narrative reference to the GGA but do not link it to specific strategies/actions or detail its components and alignment clearly.

Finally, six Parties (Belize, Bolivia, Cuba, Guyana, Panama, and Venezuela) did not refer to the GGA or the UAE Framework.

4.3. Evidence of cross-cutting considerations

To evaluate the inclusion of cross-cutting considerations, cross-referenced documents (namely NAP, sectoral NAPs, gender and climate change strategies, AdComs, etc.) were consulted and assessed to check whether and how any of the cross-cutting elements were covered.

4.3.1 Gender mainstreaming

Among the 19 BTRs submitted, **eleven Parties demonstrated moderate evidence of gender mainstreaming** (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The reason for this categorization is that, although the Party did not report on gender outcomes and impacts of implementation, it presented evidence on the remaining elements, indicating gender integration in the adaptation policy cycle. Although not all countries fully meet the three elements, the level of evidence reported allows concluding that the development of gender mainstreaming is moderate rather than low. The majority reflected moderate evidence

of: gender-disaggregated assessment of climate risks (Argentina, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), conducting gender analyses of varying depth (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), and partially integrating gender in MEL systems (Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela).

Another **five Parties** (Cuba, Guyana, Honduras, Belize, and Paraguay) showed **low evidence**. In general, they mentioned the importance of gender mainstreaming. They made broad references to the inclusion of women/gender in climate change policies. Still, there is no concrete evidence reported in the BTR, which does not carry out either a gender-disaggregated assessment of climate risks or a gender analysis.

Cuba, although recognized and referred to the gender approach, did not include or refer to gender-disaggregated data, the assessment of climate risks, nor gender outcomes and impacts derived from implementation. Guyana reported progress in gender mainstreaming; however, it does not present gender-disaggregated data, and the sectoral gender analysis is brief and limited. Honduras reported the inclusion of two specific gender-specific adaptation measures in the NAP and four in the NDC. Nevertheless, there is no reference to the elaboration of gender-disaggregated IVRAs, nor to their inclusion in the M&E system. Belize reported updating its National Gender Policy (National Climate Change Gender Action Plan) in 2022; however, this does not include an IVRA. Paraguay reports that the gender perspective is a cross-cutting approach in the NAP and that it has specific planning instruments to promote its inclusion, including the National Gender Strategy on Climate Change and the National Gender Plan on Climate Change. The latter includes an analysis of the incorporation of the gender perspective in the first AdCom (included in the NDC), but does not incorporate an IVRA with gender-disaggregated data and analysis, nor does it mention gender-transformative measures in the NAP. Also, there is no reference to its inclusion in the M&E system.

Finally, **three Parties present no evidence of gender mainstreaming in the adaptation cycle** (Bolivia, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago). The latter two did not submit a BTR adaptation component. In Bolivia, the Party reports that the gender perspective is a cross-cutting approach to the Climate Change Plurinational Policy. Still, there is no reference to gender-disaggregated data or to a climate risk assessment. However, in the agricultural sector, they include an adaptation goal.

It should be noted that none of the 19 LAC countries reported gender outcomes or impacts resulting from implementation.

Table 3. Cross-cutting considerations. Gender

Indicator	Number of Parties that have in place gender-responsive adaptation plans that: (a) integrate gender disaggregated data and gender analysis for the Impact Vulnerability and Risks Assessment processes (IVRAs); (b) include gender-specific outcomes; (c) include gender-specific indicators in the monitoring framework.[1]			
Level of integration	**High evidence**	**Moderate evidence**	**Low evidence**	**Null evidence**
	0	**11**	**5**	**4**

4.3.2 Integration of traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems

Regarding **the integration of traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems in adaptation planning processes,** the assessment considered four elements: 1. IVRAs, 2. NAPs or other adaptation policy instruments, 3. MEL systems, 4. outcomes and impacts derived from implementation.

1. To the current version of indicator submitted by experts on September 9, 2025 -Number of Parties that have in place gender-responsive adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies- 3 elements has been added necessary to operationalize gender-responsiveness in NAPs.

The assessment shows that **one country presented strong evidence of integration** across IVRAs, planning processes, and MEL systems, and reported specific outcomes and impacts derived from implementation, Panamá. In this regard, the country reports on one project, “Strengthening national and local capacities for climate risk reduction and resilience in human settlements in the district of Kusapín, Ngäbe Buglé Comarca”. Even though it is a single project implemented across six pilot communities, it addresses all four elements. Activities include raising awareness of the impacts of climate change, analyzing climate change scenarios, examining land use, providing socio-economic information, and developing a Municipal Adaptation and Resilience Plan and a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan for adaptation actions.

Moreover, **six Parties** (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guyana, Peru, and Venezuela) provided evidence and are categorized as having **moderate integration**. This implies Parties provided evidence of integration in -at least- two out of the three elements of this category: IVRAs, planning processes, and MEL systems.

For instance, Argentina reports on specific impact assessments from the perspective of indigenous peoples, based on a process of knowledge exchange with indigenous peoples' representatives and cross-references the NAP, which provides more details on the methodology used and the identification of possible adaptation actions by indigenous peoples representatives from the 4 regions. Bolivia includes a section with the identification of indigenous technologies related to water and agriculture adaptation measures. Guyana details the "Observed and Potential Impacts of Climate Change, Vulnerabilities, Risks and Opportunities" across various sectors, including a dedicated section on "Indigenous Peoples". It also mentions the Amerindian Development Fund (ADF), a project that supports community-based enterprises and livelihoods, and the Guyana REDD+ Monitoring, Reporting and Verification System, which has improved data accuracy and enabled a better understanding of how these communities contribute to forest preservation. Peru reported this evidence by cross-referencing their NAP, even though the adaptation chapter does not mention details. The NAP of Peru presents its inclusion in the IVRA assessments and the planning phase. No integration is identified in the MEL component. Outcomes and impacts derived from implementation were also not found. Venezuela included Indigenous Peoples as a specific sector, and analysed their current and future situation for different climate variables and scenarios. It does not include measures or references to them in the adaptation chapter. However, it does present information on the progress of sectoral adaptation measures targeting indigenous peoples that were established in the country's NDC (chapter 2).

Additionally, **six countries** (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay) have **low evidence of integration**. This indicates that some integration evidence was found during the adaptation planning process. In the Brazilian case, it was considered low given that integration occurs at the design and consultation stages, with a commitment to develop a thematic Adaptation Plan for Indigenous Peoples, establish a dedicated working group, and conduct online consultations. A similar situation applies to Colombia, which reported that Progress is being made on the "National Indigenous Plan for Climate Mitigation, Adaptation, and Resilience based on Indigenous knowledge systems" and presents a list of initiatives that include or are led by Indigenous peoples. In the case of Ecuador, the Party reports the inclusion of indigenous people through specific policy instruments, adaptation initiatives and projects, and a few specific indicators. Still, it does not present a specific risk assessment for them. About Honduras, the Party reports on having three adaptation measures directly associated with Indigenous Peoples and Afro-Hondurans. Still, there is no reference to their participation in the formulation of the adaptation instruments.

Regarding Mexico, it reports on climate change adaptation projects that are strengthened in the design and implementation stages with the participation of local communities and by drawing on their experiences and knowledge, perceptions, and proposals. It also highlights initiatives, such as meetings and workshops, for strengthening and exchanging knowledge among indigenous communities about the forms of adaptation they are developing to address climate challenges and to identify environmental problems in the places where they live. However, it does not appear to integrate them within their MEL systems. In Paraguay, integration is also limited. Indigenous representatives participate in the National Climate Change Commission, and the NAP includes a cross-cutting focus on Indigenous Peoples and an objective on food security. However, despite references to the Federation for the Self-Determination of Indigenous Peoples and its own adaptation and risk reduction plans, there is no clear link between these autonomous processes and the NAP.
And finally, there are **six countries** (Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago) with **no evidence of this integration,** of which the last two did not submit an adaptation component in their BTRs.

Table 4. Cross-cutting considerations. Indigenous Peoples

Indicator	Proportion of National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems integrated in (a) IVRAs, (b) MEL systems, and (c) specific outcomes and impacts derived from implementation.[2]			
Level of integration	**High evidence**	**Moderate evidence**	**Low evidence**	**Null evidence**
	1	**6**	**6**	**6**

4.3.3 Participatory and transparent processes

Participatory and transparent processes are key to setting up people-centered adaptation policies aligned with their needs and to responding to climate scenarios. This is also important for creating ownership of the national and local adaptation agenda and for fostering transformational adaptation initiatives that seek to transform social systems. In this report, participation is associated with permanent governance or institutional arrangements that enable inclusive stakeholder participation in climate policies.

Of the 17 Parties that submitted an adaptation component in their BTRs, **10 countries reflect high evidence of inclusive and participatory process for NAP formulation** (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guyana, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), with documented engagement of several stakeholders.

Several Parties presented information on institutional arrangements, which is a specific national climate governance structure: Argentina (the National Climate Change Cabinet); Brazil (Interministerial Committee on Climate Change); Chile

2. Components have been added to the current version of the indicator developed by experts and published on September 9, 2025 -Proportion of National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems-, to assess the extent to which policies are informed by such knowledge.

(the Party has several bodies spaces not articulated into a specific Committee or Cabinet, to know: Interministerial Technical Team on Climate Change of the Ministry of the Environment and the Regional Committees on Climate Change, Scientific Advisory Committee on Climate Change; and the Council of Ministers for Sustainability and Climate Change); Costa Rica (Sectoral Council for the Environment, Energy, Seas and Land Use Planning, the Interministerial Technical Committee on Climate Change, the Citizen Advisory Council on Climate Change, and the Scientific Council on Climate Change); Ecuador (Inter-institutional Committee on Climate Change); Guyana (designated lead government agencies and committees that have an official mandate related to climate change management are identified at the sector level); Panama (Ministry of the Environment is the coordinating entity, no permanent governance structure was identified for governmental and non-governmental stakeholders' participation); Peru (the High-Level Commission on Climate Change, the National Commission on Climate Change, and the Indigenous Peoples' Platform to Address Climate Change), Venezuela (Presidential Commission for Climate Change), Uruguay (National Climate Change Response System).

These Parties also provided concrete information on their participatory process and mentioned the involvement of several types of stakeholders, including subnational actors, Indigenous Peoples, civil society, and national government agencies and ministries. Some of the tools used and mentioned by the Parties include, both in person and online: thematic meetings; workshops; surveys; public-private roundtables; citizen councils; seminars; and public consultations; and one-to-one and small focus group meetings, workshops, and email/telephone correspondence.

Five countries are presenting **moderate evidence** of inclusive and participatory process for NAP formulation (Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay). These Parties reported having a specific national climate governance structure and/or legal and regulatory instruments and institutional arrangements that facilitate the participation of multiple stakeholders. However, regarding the participatory process, some did not explicitly refer to it, while others mentioned that it had happened. Nevertheless, they did not describe them or provide specific information, results, the number of people involved, or the concrete contributions made in these spaces.

One Party (Belize) reflected **low evidence**, given that they mentioned the importance of community-based participatory approaches, but it did not document any type of engagement. Moreover, it reported that climate governance structures will be formalized in 2025 with the approval of Belize's Climate Change and Carbon Initiative Market Bill. **Another** Party (Cuba) reflects **null evidence**. In general, they don't specify permanent governance or institutional arrangements for inclusive stakeholder participation, and they broadly state that NGOs and other stakeholders did participate, without providing details on the type of consultation, the tools used, the topic, etc.

Table 5. Cross-cutting considerations. Participatory and transparent processes

Indicator	Number of Parties that have developed their NAP/policy instrument in an inclusive and participatory process and reported to have documented engagement of subnational actors, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, civil society, and vulnerable groups[3].			
Level of integration	**High evidence**	**Moderate evidence**	**Low evidence**	**Null evidence**
	10	**5**	**1**	**1**

4.4. Reporting on the adaptation policy cycle

4.4.1 Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment

Most countries that submitted their BTRs and include an adaptation component report up-to-date impact, vulnerability and risk assessments (IVRAs) (Table 6). All the IVRAs include a description of observed climate changes and impacts on each country's different systems (except for Belize and Panama that do not mention observed impacts), and climate projections are reported, mostly based on CMIP5 and CMIP6 global climate models. However, the way in which the information is presented is heterogeneous and, in some cases, the

3. This indicator is part of those presented in the May 22 version by the experts.

information is scattered, repeated, or presented in an unclear manner (e.g., Bolivia). Furthermore, there are cases in which, despite this information being presented in detail in other official documents such as the NAP or national communications (e.g., Costa Rica), the Parties do not cross-reference or include a summary of this information. In other words, if these other documents are not consulted, an evaluator may come to the erroneous conclusion that IVRAs are not being conducted. This requires strengthening the capacities of reporting teams to systematize the associated information, which is often voluminous and difficult to condense into a few pages, and reinforcing the benefits of using cross-references.

17 parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities.

Table 6. *Parties that have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities in LAC.*

Country	IVRA Key Characteristics
Argentina	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. Future climate risks are qualitatively described using the IPCC AR5 and AR6 concept of risk: indicates interaction between climate hazards, exposed elements and vulnerability. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described and it states that a human rights approach was adopted to identify and analyse risks. It also cross-references the NAP and its Methodological Annex in case climate information included in the report needs to be expanded.
Belize	Describes climate projections for different RCP scenarios but it is not clear which climate models were used. The Belize National Climate Change Policy, Strategy, and Master Plan is cross-referenced but the climate projections in this document do not coincide with the ones reported, as the previous one is based in IPCC AR4. Sectoral future climate impacts are qualitatively described but it does not include a vulnerability assessment. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is not described.

Bolivia	Describes climate projections using a multi-model ensemble composed of a selection of the five best global climate models for the country from CMIP6, considering different time periods and socio-economic trajectories. It incorporates maps with projected changes in temperature and precipitation but the variables or indexes for each map are not clear. It also describes observed climate impacts and hazards. For the description of risks it uses the IPCC AR4 concept of vulnerability and describes the projected impacts, exposure, sensitivity and adaptation capacity for different sectors: water, food systems, health, ecosystems and infrastructure. This assessment could be adapted to a more updated concept of risk. It also includes a short subsection of climate risks that uses the IPCC AR6 concept of risk but without adding more information.
Brazil	Reports the IVRA based on the methodologies recorded in the Fourth National Communication and the methodological bases of the latest IPCC reports.
Chile	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. Current and future climate risks are qualitatively and quantitatively described using the IPCC AR5 and AR6 concept of risk: indicates interaction between climate hazards, exposed elements and vulnerability. This is done for the following sectors: water resources, infrastructure, energy, mining, cities, health, coastal zones, fisheries, tourism and transport. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described and a list of tools is reported to facilitate climate adaptation planning. It also includes a section describing cross-border risks.
Colombia	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. Current and future climate risks are qualitatively and quantitatively described using the IPCC AR5 and AR6 concept of risk: indicates interaction between climate hazards, exposed elements and vulnerability. This is done for the following sectors: water resources, human health, biodiversity and ecosystemic services . Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described and specific indicators are included to quantify georeferenced risks. It also includes a section describing cross-border risks.
Costa Rica	Describes observed climate hazards and its impacts in detail, with quantitative and qualitative data. Although it qualitatively describes sectoral climate risks (Water Resources, Biodiversity, Tourism, Agriculture and fishing, Health, Infrastructure and Energy), it does not describe future climate scenarios and projected hazards. The methodology to identify the latter is not specified and it does not include cross-references, although this is described in its NAP document. The Party also reports the preparation of local assessments in the Regional Action Plans for Adaptation to Climate Change, but the BTR does not make clear how these inform the NAP formulation.

Cuba	Reports climate projections in line with IPCC AR5. It uses qualitative and quantitative information to describe observed and future changes in the climate and their associated sectoral impacts. It also describes the vulnerabilities for different systems: hydraulic systems, agricultural production, human settlements, biologic diversity, coastal and marine ecosystems, fresh water ecosystems, human health and tourism.
Ecuador	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. Future climate impacts are quantitatively described focusing on climate hazards and exposed elements: describes conducted studies to quantify hazards such as flooding in urban settlements. This is done for the following sectors: cultural heritage, water resources, health, human settlements, productive and strategic, and food sovereignty. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described and a list of specific information barriers for adaptation is reported.
Guyana	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. Future climate risks are qualitatively described using the IPCC AR5 and AR6 concept of risk: indicates interaction between climate hazards, exposed elements and vulnerability. This is done for the following sectors: Agriculture, Community and Regional Development, Ecosystems and Biodiversity, Fisheries, Forestry, Health, Housing, Indigenous Peoples, Mining, Sea and River Defence Infrastructure, Tourism, Trade and Water. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described. It includes risk matrices for each sector, analysing various criteria using a scoring system, such as whether they are current or not, their probability, and the degree of consequences.
Honduras	Reports climate projections in line with IPCC AR5, but it indicates that new climate models analysis are being developed, in line with IPCC AR6. It uses qualitative and quantitative information to describe observed changes in the climate and their associated impacts, including economic losses (impacts are reported in the Loss and Damage chapter). In terms of risk analysis, it presents a qualitative analysis synthesising the information into risk chains for each of the sectors prioritised in the NAP (Agri-food and food sovereignty; Human health; Infrastructure and socio-economic development; Biodiversity and ecosystem services; and Water resources). Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described.
México	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. For each of the current climate threats, the main impacts are identified and trends in changes in the main climate variables are indicated. Specific sections are dedicated to human settlements and vulnerable groups. It also cross-references the First Adaptation Communication and other official studies and information platforms, such as the National Climate Change Vulnerability Atlas (ANVCC) y and the National Risk Atlas (ANR).

Panamá	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. It also specifies future climate impacts and risks in strategic sectors, such as ecosystemic services, health, human settlements, infrastructure, agriculture and livestock, water basins and energy transition. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described and a vulnerability index is indicated. It does not report observed impacts.
Paraguay	Describes climate projections using the results of the IPCC AR6 report, although it counts with more detailed data aligned with CMIP5 global climate models. It also specifies climate impacts and risks in strategic sectors, such as agriculture, water resources and biodiversity. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is not described.
Peru	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is described and specific indicators regarding exposure and vulnerability are indicated. It also cross-references the NAP and its Fourth National Communication in case climate information included in the report needs to be expanded. Future climate risks are qualitatively and quantitatively described in the NAP using the IPCC AR5 and AR6 concept of risk: indicates interaction between climate hazards, exposed elements and vulnerability.
Uruguay	Climate projections are based on downscaled climate models, in line with the latest IPCC Evaluation Reports. For each of the current climate threats, the main impacts are identified and trends in changes in the main climate variables are indicated. Moreover, the methodology used to elaborate the climate risk assessment is not described.
Venezuela	Describes climate projections using a multi-model ensemble composed of a selection of two global climate models for the country from CMIP6, considering the 2041-2060 time period and the SSP2 4.5 scenario. Future climate risks are qualitatively and quantitatively described using the IPCC AR5 and AR6 concept of risk: indicates interaction between climate hazards, exposed elements and vulnerability. It applies impact chains and risk matrices based on a specific scoring system in the following sectors: agriculture, water, urban settlements, science and technology, communes, basic education, university education, youth and sports, mining, disasters, health, labour, environmental quality, ecosystems and coastal areas, biodiversity, and gender and indigenous peoples which are presented as sectors as well. It also cross-references the Third National Communication.

Not all the Parties present the methodology applied to elaborate the IVRAs and to use them to inform the planification processes, which makes it difficult to evaluate the associated indicators. Only eight parties indicate (*Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Uruguay*) and three declare (*Colombia, Costa Rica* and *Mexico*) the linkage between the adaptation measures and the IVRA. In any case, it can be seen that the objectives or measures of those parties that have conducted IVRAs are consistent with these (except *Belize* and *Venezuela* that are in the process of formulation of NAPs)[4].

The BTRs reviewed do not report the existence of comprehensive national Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS) for climate threats. Still, examples of Early Warning Systems (EWS) can be found in 14 countries. In some cases, they indicate that they are in place or need to be updated (e.g. Guyana). On the other hand, when reports do refer to EWS, they do so in general terms without specifying information regarding the four pillars of an EWS: (1) disaster risk knowledge, (2) detection, monitoring, analysis, and forecasting, (3) warning dissemination and communication, and (4) preparedness and response capabilities. This reflects the need for greater coordination between climate change and disaster risk management reporting teams to facilitate the evaluation of EWS-related indicators.

*A **Early Warning System** is an integrated system of hazard monitoring, forecasting and prediction, disaster risk assessment, communication and preparedness activities, systems and processes that enables individuals, communities, governments, businesses and others to take timely action to reduce disaster risks in advance of hazardous events. On the other hand, a **Multi-Hazard Early Warning System** addresses several hazards and/or impacts of similar or different types in contexts where hazardous events may occur alone, simultaneously, cascadingly or cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential interrelated effects.*[6]

4. Cuba does not have a policy document that comprises adaptation planning but reports adaptation measures in the process of formulation or implementation, aligned with the submitted IVRA.
5. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction and World Meteorological Organization (2025). Global Status of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems. Geneva, Switzerland. Available in: https://library.wmo.int/viewer/69684/download?file=Global-Status-of-Multi-Hazard-Early-Warning-Systems-2025.pdf&type=pdf&navigator=1
6. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) (2017). Definition: Early warning system. Open-ended Intergovernmental Expert Working Group on Indicators and Terminology (OIEWG).

For example, Argentina reports information regarding EWS in both adaptation and loss and damage chapters. Bolivia reports interministerial collaboration to provide early warnings. Chile reports the existence of EWS focused on hydro-meteorological hazards. Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, México and Venezuela report the existence of regional early warning systems and/or those focused on specific hazards or topics. Uruguay has reported progress in developing EWS, but has not specified how. Although other Parties, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Guyana, Panamá and Paraguay, do not include EWSs in their reports, there is evidence on each country's official website or in specialised publications of their existence. Also, some Parties, such as Chile and Costa Rica, report that most of their institutions lack sufficient capacity to implement early warning systems.

Climate Services *are the provision and use of climate data, information and knowledge to assist decision-making. Climate services require appropriate engagement between the recipient of the service and its provider, along with an effective access mechanism to enable timely action.*[7]

There are **twelve countries that report progress on establishing climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.** Some Parties, such as Brazil, report that not all the climate data is included in a unique system, which makes information less available to the general public. In any case, initiatives to facilitate the use of climate information by the general public were reported, as in Argentina, which reported progress in developing a mobile phone app to provide access to weather forecast data and climate alerts. Also, there are cases of climate information services progress in specific sectors, such as the one regarding livestock farming in Bolivia and a drought monitor in Chile. Also, Parties like Argentina, Colombia and Costa Rica report the establishment of National Climate Change Information Systems by law, to collect and manage data and information on climate change produced by different actors.

7. https://gfcs.wmo.int/site/global-framework-climate-services-gfcs/what-are-climate-services

Many Parties count with web platforms that provide access to information on climate projections and exposure and vulnerability variables to facilitate risk assessments: SIMARCC (Argentina), AdaptaBrasil (Brazil), ARCLIM (Chile), SIIVRA (Colombia), National Climate Change Vulnerability Atlas (Mexico), Panama Climate Risk Atlas (Panama), Disaster and Risk Atlas (Paraguay).

Finally, some Parties describe their hydrological and meteorological monitoring networks to facilitate the generation of climate information, such as Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru.

4.4.2 Planning

Of those Parties that have submitted their first BTRs, **thirteen count with National Adaptation Plans** (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Perú, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay), while **five more have other national adaptation instruments,** such as the adaptation component of the NDC (Belize with a National Climate Change Policy, Strategy, and Master Plan; Bolivia with a Climate Change Plurinational Policy; Mexico, Panama and Venezuela with a NDCs). In any case, some of the countries that do not yet have NAPs, reported their intention to elaborate them (Bolivia and Cuba), or that the formulation process is underway (Belize, Panama and Venezuela).

Thirteen countries report the approval of laws that provide a regulatory framework for climate change adaptation. This group has a higher proportion of NAPs (more than 20%) than those that do not have a specific legal framework. Although having a specific law does not guarantee that NAPs will be developed, the definition of roles and responsibilities facilitates the prioritisation of the issue at the national level. For this reason, reporting on their existence and monitoring them is key to analysing the viability of the Parties' adaptation commitments.

Mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into national or sectoral development plans in Latin America and the Caribbean is uneven across countries (Table 7). It ranges from the report on the existence of coordinated policies for sectoral and subnational mainstreaming to the lack of evidence of concrete progress in this area or various types of constraints that prevent mainstreaming (institutional, technical, financial, etc.). The lack of technical and institutional capacity to address adaptation mainstreaming and its implementation at the local level was among the challenges mentioned by the Parties.

Table 7. Level of adaptation mainstreaming in countries with an adaptation component in their BTR.

Indicator	Proportion of countries integrating climate change adaptation into national (and sectoral) development plans by undertaking: (a) IVRAs; (b) adaptation measures; (c) MEL elements and (d) budget allocation.			
Level of mainstreaming	High evidence	Moderate evidence	Low evidence	Null evidence
	4	9	2	2

There are **four Parties**, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras and Uruguay, that **demonstrate high evidence of adaptation mainstreaming** in development policies, with inclusion of IVRAs, adaptation measures, and MEL elements, including adaptation allocations across sectors and ministries through adaptation labelling of national budgets. Chile reports that its Framework Law on Climate Change establishes 12 sectoral adaptation plans (8 currently being updated and 4 new ones being formulated) that address the same sectors as in its IVRA, indicating other public instruments with climate considerations and specific advances with different ministries to facilitate mainstreaming. Ecuador emphasises the importance of the NAP for integrating climate change adaptation into development planning at the national, local and sectoral levels, and the creation of enabling conditions prior to the formulation of the NAP to facilitate integration based on a prior identification of barriers. Honduras reports the incorporation of adaptation considerations in sectoral plans of agriculture and health, as well as the development of Regional Development Plans that consider the reduction of climate related vulnerabilities. Finally, Uruguay reports 4 sectoral adaptation plans (Agriculture, Cities, Coastal Areas and Energy), in addition to the integration of adaptation elements into specific development plans such as the National Water Plan and the National Policy for Comprehensive Emergency and Disaster Risk Management.

On the other hand, **nine Parties show moderate evidence, with inclusion of IVRAs, adaptation measures, and MEL elements**. Argentina reports that the mainstreaming of adaptation went hand in hand with the inclusion of diverse stakeholders (subnational governments and governmental areas of other ministries) and presents evidence of mainstreaming in the health sector (National Strategy on Health and Climate Change). Brazil reports the integration of adaptation elements into development plans related to Agriculture and Livestock Farming, Water Resources and Energy, among others. Colombia reports 7 Comprehensive Sectoral Climate Change Management Plans with adaptation elements. Costa Rica reports the incorporation of adaptation considerations in the National Development and Public Investment Plan 2023-2026 and the development of a Methodology for Climate Risk Assessment in Costa Rica's Public Infrastructure, to facilitate the design of adaptation measures to reduce climate risks of infrastructure. Mexico reports progress in the creation of strategies that consider actions related to climate change adaptation, such as the National Food Strategy and the National Strategy for the Care of Marine and Coastal Biodiversity. Panama mentions initiatives related to nature-based solutions that include the undertaking of IVRAs and articulation with other sectors. Paraguay reports the incorporation of adaptation considerations in sectoral plans of agriculture and social development. Peru reports the integration of adaptation measures into national policies and strategies across multiple thematic areas and sectors, and refers to the National Climate Change Strategy to 2050 as its overarching plan; and Venezuela reports examples of mainstreaming (education-climate brigades, gender programs tied to agro sector, sector plans), but not yet a fully consolidated cross-sector mainstreaming framework covering every sector in the NDC with uniform modalities.

There were **two countries with low evidence of adaptation mainstreaming** fund: Belize reports the drafting of two sectoral NAPs which include IVRAs (Water and Coastal Zones and Fisheries); and Cuba reports conducted sectoral IVRAs. Finally, there are two countries (Bolivia and Guyana) with **null evidence** of adaptation mainstreaming.

The Parties report the cost analysis of adaptation measures with varying levels of detail (Table 8). Bolivia (USD 3700 million for 2025-2030), Chile (USD 593 million for 2024-2029), Colombia (USD 3209 million for 2020-2030), Ecuador (USD 102 million for 2021-2030) and Paraguay (USD 6530 million for 2023-2030) have a moderate level of evidence in terms of cost analysis, as they report the costs of all adaptation measures but the methodology is not detailed. Argentina, Belize, Panama and Peru report the costs for a limited number of adaptation measures. In contrast, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela do not report the costs of implementing adaptation measures.

Table 8. Level of adaptation cost analysis in countries with an adaptation component in their BTR.

Indicator	Number of Parties where cost estimates for implementation of the NAP/Policy instrument are available.			
Level of adaptation cost analysis	**High evidence**	**Moderate evidence**	**Low evidence**	**Null evidence**
	0	**5**	**4**	**8**

Many countries acknowledge methodological and capacity challenges for quantifying the costs of adaptation. This also makes it difficult to measure the aggregate cost of countries' adaptation actions, as each country uses different methodologies, time frames, currency type and currency base years. For this reason, measuring the cost indicator for adaptation actions identified in national instruments will require a clearer definition of the methodologies to be used and greater clarity in how the information is presented: the way the information is displayed in Chile's BTR is a good example to replicate. It should be noted that this may increase the reporting burden on the Parties.

All countries that submitted BTRs with adaptation components reported receiving support for adaptation planning, except for Bolivia, which does not include or mention associated projects or capacity building. In general, funds tend to come from the Green Climate Fund and the Global

8. Despite the latter, during 2025, the Green Climate Fund approved the NAP Readiness Project "Strengthening the National Adaptation Planning towards a more climate resilient society in the Plurinational State of Bolivia".

Environmental Facility, among others. By reviewing the Green Climate Fund database, it can be verified that not all LAC countries accessed the NAP Readiness grant (e.g.: Guyana). Also, Bolivia reports “difficulties in preparing projects to access international funds, political barriers and lack of transparency in financial management, and weak coordination between levels of government to implement climate projects”.

4.4.3 Implementation

The disparity in monitoring methodologies, instruments and reported timeframes presents a challenge when it comes to using a single indicator to assess the degree of implementation (Table 9). Seven countries provide evidence of progress on any of their adaptation instruments (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Uruguay). Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay report on the status of the measures included in their NAPs. Of those countries reporting progress on their targets, two detailed progress associated with NAP goals (Ecuador and Uruguay) and three indicate progress on the adaptation component targets of their NDCs (Colombia, Ecuador and Panama).

Parties that report targets without reporting progress on specific measures present a challenge for monitoring progress, as changes in the indicators may or may not be associated with the implementation of adaptation measures (e.g.: Bolivia and Belize). Also, in some cases progress in the adaptation component of the NDCs is reported in other chapters, which makes it difficult to find the information regarding adaptation monitoring. There are also cases in which the progress in measures or targets is not declared and needs to be inferred from progress tables.



Table 9. Reporting of adaptation progress in LAC.

Country	Adaptation progress reporting
Argentina	Reports status of implementation of the adaptation measures included in the NAP with targets for 2023, with 51.5% of the measures completed or under implementation. This includes a partial report on progress in the measures, as those with targets beyond 2023 account for almost half of the total, so in total there is only evidence that demonstrates that only 38,5% of the measures completed or under implementation.
Belize	Describes progress on actions and interventions included in the country's NDC adaptation targets, by sector of activity. However, no details are provided whether this has been done through a MEL system or if the actions are actually generating progress in the targets' achievement.
Bolivia	Reports progress on 17 of the 32 adaptation targets included in the NDC by the year 2022. The latter is not declared, it was inferred from the tables included in Chapter 2. Also, it does not indicate if these targets are on track of being achieved or not, or if the progress answers to the implementation of adaptation measures. On the other hand, Chapter 4 includes a description of adaptation initiatives implemented by sector.
Brazil	Indicates that the NAP provided for four-year implementation cycles with their respective reviews (two Monitoring and Evaluation Reports were published in 2017 and 2021, respectively). It includes a table with a description of the progress made in each of the NAP targets but it is unclear if these were completed, under implementation or if the progress was due to the implementation of NAP measures.
Chile	Reports that the NAP reached an 83% implementation progress and its update was initiated during 2022. At the same time it reports the progress of the measures established in the adaptation components of the sectoral plans. The 8 commitments established in the adaptation component of Chile's 2020 NDC and the progress that has been made to date are also presented (1 completed, 7 under implementation).
Colombia	Reports progress on the 30 adaptation targets of its NDC (2020) with 28 targets under implementation. This information is presented in tables and include the responsible institution, and the main milestones. The description of progress is generally qualitative, although percentages are sometimes included.

Costa Rica	It does not report on the status of implementation of the adaptation measures included in the NAP but it incorporates the progress made in the adaptation targets included in the NDC 2020.
Cuba	Presents emphasis on activities rather than measured results or progress on specific adaptation measures, which is consistent with the lack of an adaptation policy instrument.
Ecuador	Reports progress in implementing adaptation measures during the period 2021–2023, carrying out 20 actions involving 95 activities. It also reported on progress in implementing the measures contained in Ecuador's First Adaptation Communication included in its NDC: of 103 planned targets, 60 have been implemented as of the 2021–2023 period. Ecuador also reported that specific objectives, targets and indicators were incorporated into the NAP to measure the implementation of this Plan. It reported that, as of 2023, 8 of the 11 planned targets had been implemented and provided information on their respective implementation status.
Guyana	It just specifies progress in specific climate projects (Guyana does not count with a NAP or equivalent instrument).
Honduras	Reports the progress made in each of the NAP strategic axes but it does not indicate the status of implementation of each of the adaptation measures. It also incorporates the progress made in the adaptation contributions and measures of its NDC, without referring necessarily to targets or status of implementation.
México	Adaptation measures are not clearly observed. Rather, they are lines of action that do not include associated qualitative or quantitative indicators, time markers, etc.
Panamá	Includes information demonstrating progress in implementing 41% (9 targets completed) of the 22 adaptation commitments included in the First NDC Update (NDC1) until December 2023, as well as some actions/projects implemented.
Paraguay	Reports the progress made in each of the strategic sectors of their adaptation policies. It is not possible to assess progress in implementation of each of the adaptation measures based on what has been reported.
Peru	Reports that 42 out of 84 adaptation measures included in the NDC are currently under implementation.
Uruguay	Depicts progress made in implementing the 38 adaptation measures from 2020 until 2024. 18 measures (47%) show that targets were achieved; 8 (21%) measures have not yet been implemented and 12 (32%) are currently being implemented. It describes progress made by year.

Venezuela	Does not include information on measurable targets/goals/actions on track of being achieved. There are progress notes and small-scale indicators for specific programs (e.g., gender outreach, brigades, pilot restorations) which show implementation beginnings, but many measures remain at planning or early execution steps. The Party acknowledges difficulties obtaining complete implementation data across institutions — limiting ability to show robust national-scale implementation status.

Of those Parties that have submitted their first BTRs, **thirteen present the international public finance for adaptation received** (Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Panamá, Paraguay and Uruguay). These present the information in different ways and for various time periods (Table 10). In all cases, the total amount of adaptation international finance received is not disaggregated by sector, channel and type of financial instrument, so it is necessary to calculate the amounts by using the climate project tables. However, not all countries include tables listing climate projects that justify the amounts established (e.g., Colombia, Ecuador, and Honduras), or calculate total amounts broken down by channel, instrument, or sector. Even those that do include tables do not always cover all these areas. Furthermore, when reporting by sector or subsector, they do not necessarily coincide with the topics in the UAE-FGCR.

On the other hand, the criteria for reporting amounts received for specific periods differ depending on whether they were disbursed in the reporting period or whether they consider the total amount of projects under implementation during the implementation period, which makes it difficult to calculate an annual amount. Similarly, some report only non-reimbursable amounts, overstating the climate finance received. It is worth noting that most of the repayable financing corresponds to loans, placing additional pressure on the underlying vulnerability in the countries of the region.

Another challenge that can be identified in monitoring adaptation funding based on the information provided in the BTRs is the use of climate categories and the uncertainty caused by the cross-cutting category, which is applied differently in different reports. Furthermore, not all countries report the existence of climate labels for their projects or adopt different criteria for categorisation, which makes it difficult to define the specific contributions of each to adaptation.

Table 10. Reporting of international public finance for climate adaptation received by developing countries for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments and planning processes and/or strategies in LAC.

Country	International public finance for adaptation[9]	Disaggregation by project					
		Type of action	Channel	Instrument type	Sector	Implementation timeframe	Status
Argentina	USD 43,280,000 (4%) (disbursed 2022-2023)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Belize	USD 120,967,693 (96.21%) (total amount of projects under implementation 2014-2024)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Bolivia	USD 2,347,000,000 (68.87%) (total amount of projects under implementation 2014-2024)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Brazil	USD 51,122,167 (9.91%) (total amount of projects under implementation 2020-2022)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

9. The percentages show the proportion of adaptation funding with respect to the total of the climate funding received.

Country	International public finance for adaptation[9]	Disaggregation by project					
		Type of action	Channel	Instrument type	Sector	Implementation timeframe	Status
Chile	USD 7,534,221 (11.5%) (non-refundable; total amount of projects under implementation 2022-2024)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No* (only duration in years)	Yes
Colombia	USD 252,229,534 (39.2%) (non-refundable; total amount of projects under implementation 2021-2023)	Does not provide a list of projects, but the amount of international finance received is aggregated and described per type of climate action, channel, sector and subsector.					
Costa Rica	USD 142,371,978 (23.88%) (total amount of projects under implementation 2018-2023)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No* (only year of disbursement)	No
Cuba	USD 54,005,444 (90%) (disbursed 2021-2022)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No* (only year of disbursement)	Yes
Ecuador	USD 259,735,698 (34.8%) (disbursed 2021-2023)	Does not provide a list of projects, but the amount of international finance received is aggregated and described per type of climate action, channel, sector and subsector.					
Guyana	No data						
Honduras	USD 270,670,188 (25.3%) (disbursed 2018-2024)	Does not provide a list of projects, but the amount of international finance received is aggregated and described per type of climate action, channel, sector and subsector.					

Country	International public finance for adaptation[9]	Disaggregation by project					
		Type of action	Channel	Instrument type	Sector	Implementation timeframe	Status
México	No data						
Panamá	USD 665,611,320 (47%) (disbursed 2021-2024)* *presents only non-refundable projects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No* (only year of disbursement)	Yes
Paraguay	USD 206,692,733 (32.7%) (total amount of projects under implementation 2020-2024)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peru	No data						
Uruguay	USD 25,401,928 (31%) (total amount of projects under implementation during 2023)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	N/A
Venezuela	No data						

4.4.4 Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

Across the region, **most countries report concrete progress in designing or implementing Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) systems** for adaptation, though the level of institutionalisation and operational maturity varies considerably.

11 countries have designed and begun operationalising MEL systems (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guyana, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela). These countries already have systems in place at different stages of operationalisation, but are now starting to track and assess adaptation measures and goals.

Table 11. Parties that designed and/or operationalised a system for monitoring, evaluation, and learning

11	Number of Parties that have designed and/or operationalised a system for monitoring, evaluation, and learning for their national adaptation efforts.	
Country	**MEL System Status**	**Key Characteristics**
Argentina	Designed and partially operational	Purposes: show the degree of progress and results of the goals and measures of the NAP; ensure continuous improvement; and enable communication and dissemination of progress. Partial and initial operationalisation. Limited evidence that outcomes and impacts are systematically considered in the implementation of adaptation measures.
Brazil	Designed and operational	National MEL system in place, currently under review; integrated approach across mitigation and adaptation.
Chile	Designed and being operationalised	Developing a robust, public platform for systematic monitoring aims to standardise indicators and processes.
Colombia	Designed, not operational	Working toward full implementation by 2028.
Costa Rica	Designed and partially operational	Purposes: facilitate planning and decision-making based on accurate information, and disseminate information. Mainly based on output indicators, outcome indicators will be defined and evaluated in 2026. Partial and initial operationalisation. Low institutional capacity to evaluate the output indicators for the NAP measures.
Guyana	Designed	There was no evidence of operationalisation.

Mexico	Designed and partially operational	The MEL framework comprises three subsystems, each with management and impact indicators that enable the evaluation of the progress of adaptation measures at the administrative level and in terms of concrete results. Reports difficulties in operationalising.
Panama	Designed and operational	Purposes: generate knowledge about the evolution of the adaptation context, needs, and experiences (learning); report to stakeholders on the progress and/or results of adaptation actions (accountability); and adaptation measures and results. Comprises 21 climate change adaptation indicators. It developed a National Adaptation Data System and Transparency Platform.
Peru	Designed and operational	Based on the SINAMECC platform, it tracks 84 adaptation measures; reports through BTR; and acknowledges challenges in establishing baselines.
Uruguay	Designed and operational	MEL system updated annually (2020–2023); coordinated by DINACC under the national climate response system (SNRCC). The Party designed a visualizer that enables consultation on progress toward the NDC and related indicators.
Venezuela	Designed and operational	System in place, though the report provided limited detail.

Two countries are in the process of designing or operationalising a MEL system (Ecuador and Paraguay). These countries are strengthening institutional and technical capacities. Another **three** countries reported **not having a formal MEL system** (Belize, Bolivia, and Honduras). These countries do not report an established MEL system, though Honduras mentions informal monitoring mechanisms (questionnaires, workshops) and an ongoing evaluation of its NAP (2018–2024).

Table 11. Parties without MEL system or in the process of its development

Country	MEL System Status	Key Characteristics
Ecuador	Under development	Supported by CBIT; developing a Climate Transparency System coordinated by a National Climate Change Registry.
Paraguay	Under development	It has identified 51 indicators (progress, impact, outcome)
Honduras	No formal system	Informal monitoring through questionnaires and workshops; NAP evaluation (2018–2024) underway.
Belize	Not designed	No MEL system reported.
Bolivia	Not designed	No MEL system reported.

As evidenced, establishing MEL systems is still a work in progress that needs to be consolidated in almost the majority of cases, and only a few countries have been able to design and run them. Moreover, these systems include output- or process-based indicators; therefore, limited evidence on outcomes and impacts that inform adaptation implementation was found. References to the effectiveness of adaptation actions were absent in the LAC BTRs.

Regarding institutional capacity to implement MEL systems in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is **uneven across countries**, ranging from advanced operationalisation to early-stage design or limited institutional readiness. Among the challenges Parties mentioned are the lack of: baseline definition and methodological consistency; a unified national methodology; specialised technical teams; inter-institutional coordination across different levels of government and sectors; data collection at the subnational level, etc.

Table 12. Number of Parties with institutional capacity for MEL system implementation

Indicator	Number of Parties with sufficient institutional capacity, including adequate financial resources to fully operate the national adaptation MEL system.			
Level of institutional capacity building	**High evidence**	**Moderate evidence**	**Low evidence**	**Null evidence**
	2	**5**	**9**	**1**

There are **two Parties,** *Uruguay* and *Panama*, **that demonstrate strong institutional capacity, with advanced operationalisation of the MEL system,** public access through a visualisation platform, and well-established institutional coordination mechanisms.

On the other hand, **five Parties show moderate evidence:** *Argentina* published its first monitoring report (2023) but has limited evidence on evaluating outcomes and impacts; *Brazil* has implemented a MEL system during the implementation of its first NAP and is in the process of reviewing and updating both, *Chile* is advancing the design and operationalization of a national MEL platform but faces methodological and technical capacity gaps; *Ecuador* has institutional frameworks under development showing partial implementation; and *Peru* has institutional arrangements via the SINAMECC platform; operational but still constrained by limited baseline data and full indicator coverage.

There are **nine countries in which was found low evidence of Institutional capacity** (Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guyana, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Venezuela): Bolivia identifies the need for a MEL system and indicator development; Colombia has established governance structures but reported is not operational; Costa Rica has strong institutional frameworks but progress on indicator evaluation is pending until 2026; Cuba presents some progress on adaptation actions but it does not have a MEL system in place; Guyana, reports having an MEL system, but there is no information on how it works or whether it provides information for further adaptation planning and implementation; Honduras is implementing a CBIT project to build capacity but has not formal MEL system; Mexico developed frameworks and tools but provides limited evidence on implementation; Paraguay is developing its MEL system with CBIT support; institutional processes are still in an early phase; and Venezuela reports it has a system in place, though the report provided limited detail. Finally, there is **one country** (Belize) **with null evidence of MEL design or institutional arrangements in place.**

5. References

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Annex Methodological guidelines

Table 1.Introduction to an adaptation component of the BTR

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
1.1. Country	Paris Agreement membership	*1.1.1 Number of countries that submitted a first BTR (Jan 2024 to July 2025)*
1.2. Date of submission	Month DD, YYYY	1.2.1 *Number of Parties that submitted their first BTR in 2024* *Number of Parties that submitted their first BTR in 2025.*
1.3. Region	Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, LAC, Western Europe, and others (UN regional groups)	*1.3.1 Number of BTRs submitted by region*
1.4. UNFCCC Annex	Annex I/Non Annex I	*1.4.1. Number of BTRs submitted by Annex I Parties* *1.4.2. Number of BTRs submitted by non-Annex I Parties*
Link to the document	Included in https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports	
1.5. Adaptation component, chapter or section	(Yes/No) Adaptation appears in the heading of the chapter or section, and the content of the section or chapter is about adaptation.	*1.5.1. Number of Parties with an adaptation component in their first BTR.*
1.6. Loss and damage	(Yes/No) Loss and damage is integrated in the BTR (any form)	*1.6.1. Number of Parties with a Loss and Damage component in their first BTR.*

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	(Yes/No) Loss and damage included in adaptation section or chapter (Yes/No) Loss and damage as stand standalone section or chapter	*1.6.2. Number of Parties with a Loss and Damage component in their first BTR included in the adaptation section.* *1.6.3. Number of Parties with a Loss and Damage component in their first BTR as a standalone section.*
1.7. Use of MPGs in Decision 18/CMA.1 for elaborating an adaptation component, section or chapter	Qualitative analysis: The MPGs include 8 headings or elements in "IV. Information related to climate change impacts and adaptation under Article 7 of the Paris Agreement" (para 104-117). -**Aligned:** STRUCTURE. The adaptation chapter or section uses the structure of the MPGs or their elements, even if they are not ordered in the same way. CONTENT. At least 5 of the headings or elements included in section IV of the MPGs are reported by the Party whether or not are in order. **-Not aligned:** STRUCTURE. The adaptation chapter or section does not use the structure of the MPGs nor their elements. CONTENT. 4 or fewer than 4 headings or elements included in section IV of the MPGs are reported by the Party, whether or not they are in order.	*1.7.1. Number of Parties with an adaptation component in their first BTRs aligned with MPGs.*

Table 2. The UAE Framework in BTRs

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
2.1. Reference to the GGA and or the UAE Framework	- Party includes references to GGA (Yes/No)	*2.1.1. Number of Parties that include references to the GGA (analysis only indicator)*
	- Party includes references to the UAE Framework (Yes/No)	*2.1.2. Number of Parties that include references to the UAE Framework (analysis only indicator)*
	- Levels of inclusion of GGA and UAE Framework: -**No inclusion**: no reference to the GGA nor the UAE Framework -**Low inclusion**: There is a narrative reference to the GGA or the UAE Framework, not linked to specific strategies or actions -**Moderate inclusion:** There is a reference in the context of par. 109 of the MPGs "adaptation strategies, policies, plans, goals and actions" (implementation of adaptation actions in accordance with the GGA). -**High inclusion**: There is a clear mention of the GGA components included in article 7.1 and how the progress of adaptation action in the country contributes to this. There is a clear mention of the UAE Framework and its targets, and how the progress of adaptation action in the country contributes to the progress of the targets. Note: Given the current state of negotiations on the UAE Framework indicators, it is unlikely that Parties have been able to include information on target compliance that would help assess progress. However, this will be a key issue of BTR2.	*2.1.3. Level of reference by country, region (low, moderate, high) (analysis only indicator)*

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
2.2. Cross-cutting considerations. Gender	Gender mainstreaming is defined as the systematic process of implementing gender actions by developing a gender-baseline, facilitating a participatory design process, identifying objectives and activities, and developing MEl systems that are gender-responsive (NAP Global Network & UNFCCC, 2019) GENDER RESPONSIVE NAPs Gender-responsive approaches examine and actively address gender norms, roles, and inequalities. They go beyond sensitivity to gender differences, actively seeking to promote gender equality, which often involves specific actions to empower women in their households and communities as well as broader policy and planning processes (UNFCCC, 2019). The assessment of a gender responsive NAP consists of 3 elements: 1. gender-disaggregated assessment of climate impacts, risks, and vulnerability, 2. gender-responsive MEL systems, 3. gender outcomes and impacts derived from implementation. Level of integration: -**Null evidence**: there is no evidence of the integration of gender at any stage of the adaptation cycle and in any BTR section. -**Low evidence:** there is evidence of the relevance of including disaggregated data, and also gender considerations in the planning processes.	2.2.1 Number of Parties that have in place gender-responsive adaptation plans that: (a) integrate gender disaggregated data and gender analysis for the Impact Vulnerability and Risks Assessment processes (IVRAs); (b) include gender-specific outcomes; (c) include gender-specific indicators in the monitoring framework[10].

10. To the current version of indicator submitted by experts on September 9, 2025 -Number of Parties that have in place gender-responsive adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies- 3 elements have been added to operationalize gender-responsiveness in NAPs.

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	-Moderate evidence: there is evidence of gender-disaggregated assessment of climate risks, and of undertaking gender analysis for a gender responsive adaptation process. Gender is partially integrated in MEL systems. **-High evidence:** there is evidence of gender-disaggregated assessment of climate risks, and of undertaking gender analysis for a gender responsive adaptation process. There are gender outcomes and impacts reported as part of the implementation. MEL systems report on gender dimensions of risks and vulnerabilities and of adaptation outputs and outcomes.	
2.3. Cross-cutting considerations. Indigenous Peoples.	In line with Decision 2/CMA.5 para 14, adaptation action should be based, inter alia, on traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge, and local knowledge systems. The assessment consists of the integration of traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems in adaptation planning processes, in the understanding that integration presupposes being informed by. It is considered through 4 elements: 1. IVRAs, 2. NAPs or other adaptation policy instruments, 3. MEL systems, 4. outcomes and impacts derived from implementation. Level of integration: **-Null evidence**: there is no evidence of the integration at any stage of the adaptation cycle and in any BTR section.	2.3.1 Proportion of National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems integrated in (a) IVRAs, (b) MEL systems, and (c) specific outcomes and impacts derived from implementation[11].

11. Components have been added to the current version of the indicator developed by experts and published on September 9, 2025 -Proportion of National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes that have been informed by traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems-, to assess the extent to which policies are informed by such knowledge.

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	-**Low evidence:** there is evidence of integration as part of the adaptation planning process. -**Moderate evidence:** there is evidence of integration in IVRAs, planning processes, and in MEL systems. -**High evidence:** there is evidence of integration in IVRAs, planning processes, and in MEL systems. There are specific outcomes and impacts reported as part of the implementation.	
2.4. Cross-cutting considerations. Participatory and transparent processes	Participation is associated with permanent governance or institutional arrangements for the inclusive participation of different stakeholders in climate policies. Level of participation and inclusion in the policy formulation process: -**No evidence**: no reference to permanent governance or institutional arrangements for inclusive stakeholders' participation in climate policies, nor to participatory processes or their outcomes, no references to access to information. -**Low evidence**: reference to the importance of establishing permanent governance or institutional arrangements for inclusive stakeholder participation in climate policies, but no reference to participatory processes undertaken or their results. -**Moderate evidence:** reference to existing permanent governance or institutional arrangements for inclusive stakeholder participation in climate policies, but no reference to participatory processes undertaken or their results.	2.4.1 Number of Parties that have developed their NAP/policy instrument in an inclusive and participatory process and reported to have documented engagement of subnational actors, Indigenous Peoples, women, youth, civil society, and vulnerable groups[12].

<table>
<tr><th>Section</th><th>Guidelines for analysis</th><th>Indicators</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>-High evidence: reference to permanent governance or institutional arrangements for inclusive stakeholder participation in climate policies, together with evidence of participatory processes undertaken, and of how their results have been integrated into the planning and implementation process.</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>2.5. APC 1. Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment (by subcomponent).</td><td>-Party reports to have an impact, risk, and vulnerability assessment.

(Yes/No) Checklist for up-to-date climate hazards assessment (must fulfill all):<table><tr><td>Refers to both observed changes and projections, related to extreme events (floods, fires, droughts, heat waves, etc.) or slow onset events (land degradation, sea level rise, etc.), if applicable.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Utilizes climate models consistent with those outlined in the IPCC Atlas.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Considers different shared socio-economic pathways (SSPs) or levels of emissions.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Refers to both climate signals and their associated hazards (in cases where the climate signal does not match the hazard, as opposed to heat waves, for example).</td><td></td></tr></table></td><td>2.5.1. Number of Parties that have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts, and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities[13].</td></tr>
</table>

13. It has been used the indicator from the May 22 version, as the new indicator presents some challenges when assessing the extent to which IVRAs are accessible, understandable, usable, and relevant -Number of Parties that have accessible, understandable, usable, relevant and up to date climate risk information and comprehensive risk assessment-.

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	Note: Observed changes in climate hazards may be shown in both the adaptation and loss and damage sections. (Yes/No) Checklist for up-to-date **climate change impacts assessment** (must fulfill all): Refers to (observed) impacts associated with extreme or slow onset events, on the country's different systems (economic sectors, population, and ecosystems). **Note:** Climate change impacts may be shown in both the adaptation and loss and damage sections. (Yes/No) Checklist for up-to-date **climate change risks assessment** (must fulfill all): Refers to projected impacts (risks) associated with extreme or slow onset events, on the country's different systems (economic sectors, population, and ecosystems). It applies IPCC AR5 and AR6 concepts of risk. When indicating the projected effects of climate change on the country's different systems, it refers to the climate hazard responsible for such risk, qualitatively or quantitatively (see climate hazard assessment). When indicating the projected effects of climate change on the country's different systems, it refers to the exposed elements related to such risk, qualitatively or quantitatively (people, ecosystems, economic activities, infrastructure, etc.). When indicating the projected effects of climate change on the country's different	

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	systems, it refers to the vulnerability of the exposed elements related to such risk, qualitatively or quantitatively.	
	Note: Climate change risks may be shown in both the adaptation and loss and damage sections.	
	- (Yes/No) Priorities, actions, and/or measures are linked to the impact, ris,k and vulnerability assessment. Describe the level of use of IVRA in adaptation planning.	2.5.2. *Number of Parties that have used up-to-date climate risk information and comprehensive risk assessment to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.*
	- (Yes/No) Party reports having an early warning system. Describe briefly. **Note:** It can be one integrated system or various, depending on the climate hazard.	2.5.3.*Number of Parties that have established multi-hazard early warning systems.*
	-(Yes/No) Party reports to have climate information services and systematic observation. Describe briefly.	2.5.4. *Number of Parties that have established climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.*

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
2.6. APC 2. Planning (by subcomponent)	- (Yes/No) Party reports the development of a NAP or equivalent instrument, approved by a legal act. Indicate whether it has been submitted to the NAP-Central, and when.	*2.6.1. Number of Parties with adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.*
	- (Yes/No) Party reports the adoption of national legislation or other legislative frameworks on adaptation. Indicate the name of the laws and the date of approval.	*2.6.2. Number of Parties that have adopted national legislation or other legislative frameworks on adaptation*
	-Party reports adaptation mainstreaming in strategies and plans: Level of mainstreaming: - **Null evidence:** there is no evidence of adaptation mainstreaming into national and/or sectoral development plans. - **Low evidence:** there is evidence of adaptation mainstreaming by including IVRAs in national and/or sectoral development plans. - **Moderate evidence:** there is evidence of adaptation mainstreaming by including IVRAs and adaptation measures in national and /or sectoral development plans. - **High evidence:** there is evidence of adaptation mainstreaming by including	*2.6.3. Proportion of countries integrating climate change adaptation into national (and sectoral) development plans by undertaking: (a) IVRAs; (b) adaptation measures; (c) MEL elements and (d) budget allocation*[14].

14. IAn indicator from the May 22 version has been used, as it captures different dimensions of adaptation mainstreaming. 3 elements have been added to assess mainstreaming. The indicators suggested in the September 9 version refer to the integration of climate risks into public investments and public procurement, as well as adaptation budgets, which, in our view, does not necessarily indicate mainstreaming.

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	IVRAs, adaptation measures, and MEL elements in national and/or sectoral development plans. Also, there is a reference to national budgets reflecting adaptation allocations across sectors and ministries. - Party reports cost estimates of national climate adaptation implementation and indicates sources of finance. Level of adaptation cost analysis: - **No evidence:** no reference to the estimation of costs of climate adaptation implementation. - **Low evidence:** estimation costs applied a limited number of measures, but there is no reference to the methodologies used to calculate them. - **Moderate evidence:** estimation costs applied to all measures, with some evidence of the methodologies used. - **High evidence:** a total estimate of the adaptation measures is available, and details are provided on the methodologies applied. -Costing of adaptation actions or measures to be implemented in X timeframe. Specify if this information is disaggregated by thematic areas. - (Yes/No) Party reports international support received or provided and mobilized for formulation of NAPs, policy instruments, and planning	***MoIs*** *2.6.4. Number of Parties where cost estimates for implementation of the NAP/Policy instrument are available*[15]. *2.6.5. Costs of adaptation actions identified in adopted national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies.* *2.6.6. Number of Parties receiving or providing and mobilizing international support for formulation of*

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	processes and/or strategies, including for capacity development. Describe briefly and indicate source of funding.	*National Adaptation Plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, including for capacity development.*
2.7. APC3. Implementation	-Party reports the progress in implementing NAPs, policies, and strategies. It is proposed to measure two parts: a) the share of targets/goals/actions on track of being achieved; and/or b) the proportion of adaptation actions at different levels of implementation (e.g., not started, under implementation, completed). Describe briefly the main achievements. Level of evidence of implementation: **Low evidence of implementation:** The party does not include information on measurable targets/goals/actions on track of being achieved or there is evidence of less than half of adaptation measures under implementation or completed. **Moderate evidence of implementation:** The party includes information demonstrating progress in implementing at least half of adaptation measures, including targets/goals/actions. **High evidence of implementation**: The party includes evidence that all adaptation measures are being implemented and targets/goals/actions are on track to be met within the committed timeframes, through MEL systems.	*2.7.1. Degree of implementation of national adaptation plans, policies and strategies.*

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	-Information provided by Parties on adaptation finance provided (developed countries) and received (developing countries) for implementing NAPs, strategies, and policies. Describe briefly how the data is reported and if it is disaggregated by channel, financial instrument, and targets.	***MoIs*** *2.7.2. Amount of international public finance for climate adaptation provided by developed countries and received by developing countries for the implementation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies per [time frame]*
2.8. APC4. MEL	-(Yes/No) Party reports having designed, and/or operationalized a MEL system. Briefly describe the MEL system (indicate approach, purpose, indicators (if any), reporting, and institutional arrangements).	2.8.1. *Number of Parties that have designed and/or operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts.*
	-Party reports to have institutional capacity to implement the MEL system. Level of institutional capacity building for national MEL system implementation: - **No evidence:** no reference to the design or operationalization of a MEL system, nor to institutional capacities or arrangements required for its development. - **Low evidence:** reference to the design or intention to design a MEL system, but no indication of it being operational. References to the need or intention to build institutional capacity, but no existing initiatives or resources are identified.	2.8.2. *Number of Parties with sufficient institutional capacity, including adequate financial resources to fully operate the national adaptation MEL system.*

Section	Guidelines for analysis	Indicators
	- **Moderate evidence:** reference to the design of a MEL system, with partial or initial operationalization. Institutional arrangements or capacity-building initiatives are reported, but evidence of full functionality is limited. - **High evidence:** MEL system is reported as fully designed, and operationalized, with evidence of outcomes and impacts of adaptation measures documented through it. Institutional capacity is reported to be in place and effectively enabling MEL implementation.	