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Co-CoA

Orchestrating complexity to prevent systemic fragmentation

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Orchestrating complexity to prevent systemic fragmentation

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


1. Introduction

As the international community moves from negotiation to implementation, one key challenge is translating global indicators into actionable, context-relevant monitoring systems at the national and subnational levels. In this regard, CoCoA “Collective Construction of Adaptation Indicators”, contributes with a bottom-up perspective by engaging civil society organisations, local actors, and technical experts across Latin America and the Caribbean to reflect on how adaptation indicators can be operationalised in real-world contexts. This approach helps bridge the gap between global methodological discussions and the realities of data availability, institutional capacities, and locally identified adaptation priorities.

Moreover, CoCoA fosters a collaborative space for collective learning and co-production of knowledge. By bringing together organisations working directly with communities and adaptation initiatives on the ground, the initiative helps identify practical methodologies, locally relevant metrics, and participatory approaches that can inform the implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) framework. In the context of the newly adopted Belem Adaptation Indicators package, such bottom-up engagement is particularly relevant to ensure that monitoring processes reflect territorial realities, incorporate diverse knowledge systems, and support developing countries in integrating indicators into national adaptation planning and reporting processes, including National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs).

As a two-way learning process, CoCoA brings information on adaptation negotiations closer to communities and, at the same time, serves as a bridge connecting local and community experiences to the international level. To contribute to this process, this report provides updated information on recent developments in the negotiations and their main challenges leading up to the next sessions. It focuses on the COP30 process and outcomes on adaptation and the challenges they pose for accelerated implementation. Therefore, it is of particular interest to examine orchestration processes as a way to understand the interrelationships within and between climate regimes in a world where geopolitical threats have multiplied.






2. A zoom into the COP30 process

COP30 was marked by significant procedural and transparency concerns that shaped the dynamics and outcomes of the negotiations. Even before the start of the Conference, Parties faced an already crowded agenda, with eight additional items proposed by different groups and countries. The Brazilian Presidency eventually secured the adoption of the agenda on the understanding that consultations on several politically sensitive issues would take place under Presidency-led processes. These consultations included discussions on the implementation of developed countries' finance obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, unilateral trade-restrictive measures, and responses to the latest NDCs and biennial transparency reports in relation to the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gaps. These bundled discussions ultimately led to the adoption of the “Mutirão” decision. While many delegations advocated for references to fossil fuel phase-out pathways or roadmaps and for stronger language on halting and reversing deforestation, neither of these elements were reflected in the final outcome.

During the second week of the Conference, negotiations were under a Presidency-led process characterized by shuttle diplomacy and closed consultations, particularly at the ministerial level and through Heads of Delegation (HoD) meetings. Participation in these meetings was highly restricted, often limited to two representatives per negotiating group. As a result, many countries were left without direct representation in key discussions, raising concerns about inclusiveness and transparency. The Presidency also relied on a “take-it-or-leave-it” approach in the final stages of negotiations, presenting revised texts late in the process with limited time for Parties to review or provide input. These dynamics constrained opportunities for open exchange among Parties and limited the possibility of building consensus through transparent negotiation processes.





The increasingly closed nature of the consultations also made it difficult for observers and civil society organizations to closely follow developments in key negotiation streams, including the GGA. These procedural and political tensions became particularly visible during the closing plenary of COP30 on 22 November 2025, where several Parties raised points of order and objections during the adoption of key decisions. In the case of the GGA, Panama, Uruguay and other Parties reported that their requests for points of order were not acknowledged by the Presidency before adopting the decision. Several delegations expressed concern that the indicators included in the final decision departed significantly from the technical work conducted over the previous two years by Parties and the expert group, questioning of the relationship between scientific-technical processes and political decisions, in a geopolitical context adverse to the credibility of climate multilateralism

COP30 had been widely framed as the “Adaptation COP”, raising expectations for meaningful progress on the adaptation agenda. While some outcomes were achieved—including the completion of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience (UAE-FGCR), the adoption of a set of indicators for the GGA, decision on NAPs and the introduction of text on tripling adaptation finance —many Parties expressed dissatisfaction with the negotiation process and outcomes. Thus, although the COP30 outcomes provide a basis for further work, significant efforts will be required in the coming negotiation cycles to strengthen the robustness, legitimacy and operational value of the main GGA outcome at COP30, the Belem Adaptation Indicators (BAI).



3. Deep dive into the adaptation architecture and latest outcomes

Over the past decades, the adaptation landscape has evolved, helping to elevate the topic to the highest level. Nonetheless, the need for greater articulation among the several pieces is identified as a challenge to improve the multilateral process outreach at multiple scales.



3.1. The Global Goal on Adaptation

The GGA is a key component of the Paris Agreement architecture, balancing the temperature goal and contributing to the ambition cycles by assessing collective progress on the Global Stocktake (GST). Over the past decade, negotiations have centered on how to move from an aspirational goal of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and achieving an adequate adaptation response in the context of the temperature goal, to qualitative and quantitative approaches that allow progress to be assessed on different scales.

Along this path, the establishment of the UAE-FGCR was a key milestone in moving towards the technical and political operationalization of the goal (Decision 2/CMA.5). It incorporates 11 targets in 7 thematic areas (water, food and agriculture, biodiversity and ecosystems, cultural heritage, health, infrastructure and human settlements, poverty and livelihoods), and 4 aligned with the adaptation iterative cycle (impact, vulnerability and risk assessment; planning; implementation; monitoring, evaluation and learning). The UAE-FGCR also embedded a number of cross-cutting considerations from gender, social inclusion, human rights, intergenerational equity and social justice, participatory and fully transparent approaches, to the contribution of children, youth, people with disabilities, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, people of African descent and migrants to adaptation. These cross-cutting considerations evolved and enlarged from Decision 2/CMA.5 to 12/CMA.7.

Although the 11 targets to 2030 already provide a layer of operationalization of the GGA, the adaptation community agreed on the need to develop common indicators that, despite their voluntary nature for use by the Parties, could help close the gap in collective assessment of progress in adaptation, evidenced in the first GST (GST1) and towards the second GST (GST2).



Figure 1. The UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience

UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience

MOI & Support

01

Purpose

Achieve the GGA and review its progress, including action and support.

02

Targets

Iterative Adaptation Cycle



Monitoring, evaluation and learning

Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment

Implementation

Planning

Sectors / Themes



03

Cross-cutting considerations



Groups

- Children
- Youth
- People with disabilities
- Indigenous Peoples and local communities
- People of African descent
- Migrants



Approaches

- Adaptation
- Gender equality
- Intergenerational equity
- Human rights
- Social justice
- Participatory and fully transparent approaches

04

Belem Adaptation Indicators

59 indicators

05

Sources of Information


Decision 19/CMA.1 - Paragraph 37

Figure 2. The targets of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience

Targets

01

Iterative Adaptation Cycle



Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment

01

By 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, and by 2027 all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.

Planning

02

By 2030 all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans.

Implementation

03

By 2030 all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in the assessments referred to in paragraph 10(a) above.

Monitoring, evaluation and learning

04

By 2030 all Parties have designed, established and operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system.

02

Sectors / Themes



Health

Attaining resilience against climate change related health impacts, promoting climate-resilient health services, and significantly reducing climate-related morbidity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities;



Water

Significantly reducing climate-induced water scarcity and enhancing climate resilience to water-related hazards towards a climate-resilient water supply, climate-resilient sanitation and towards access to safe and affordable potable water for all.



Food & agriculture

Attaining climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply and distribution of food, as well as increasing sustainable and regenerative production and equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all.



Infrastructure

Increasing the resilience of infrastructure and human settlements to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all, and minimizing climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements.



Poverty & livelihoods

Substantially reducing the adverse effects of climate change on poverty eradication and livelihoods, in particular by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all.



Ecosystems & biodiversity

Reducing climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, and accelerating the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation and the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine and coastal ecosystems.



Cultural heritage

Protecting cultural heritage from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems.



The Belém Decision (12/CMA.7) has technical and political complexity, especially when considering the number of mandates, the potential overlap of some of them, and the lack of consensus yet on the implications of processes such as the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR), the Belém-Addis Vision (BAV), the indicator testing process, and the new governance space given by the technical task force, among others. The legitimacy of the outcome ultimately depends on the collective will to turn the page on political frustrations and clarify, sooner rather than later, the expectations associated with the grey areas of the decision.

Figure 3. The Belém Decision on the Global Goal on Adaptation




Figure 3 categorizes the provisions of the Belém Decision regarding the GGA into distinct buckets. The **first bucket encompasses elements that foster stability** by helping to assemble the fragmented adaptation architecture, notably through the GGA standing agenda item. It also captures progress on cross-cutting considerations, reflecting the evolution of adaptation as a human rights-centered agenda. Furthermore, it addresses critical procedural steps, such as the mandate to invite Parties to test the indicators; without this pilot testing, it will be exceedingly difficult to realistically assess the text's implications and the methodological needs leading up to Addis Ababa. Similarly, it reaffirms that the BAIs, alongside other components of the UAE-FGCR, serve as foundational sources for evaluating collective progress in GST2, which will subsequently inform the review of the Framework itself.



A **second bucket identifies several contentious issues** within the Belém Decision that introduce uncertainty and could potentially undermine the implementation of the UAE-FGCR. These include the explicit absence of further financial obligations arising from the BAIs, and the unprecedented inclusion of references to liability and compensation within the adaptation agenda—the consequences of which remain unclear. An additional complexity is that the indicators do not prescribe standardized methodologies or data collection processes. It is challenging to envision how a global political and methodological framework like the UAE-FGCR can evaluate aggregate adaptation progress without standardizing these elements. While the intent is clearly to avoid a prescriptive, one-size-fits-all approach to adaptation, the core purpose of a global framework is to assess collective progress while drawing on national realities. Such an assessment fundamentally requires instruments that offer a degree of comparability.

Another bucket outlines **pressing issues that require short-term discussion and resolution**. These include: the role of the NWP in addressing knowledge gaps; the modalities and expected outcomes of both the technical work (improving BAI metadata and methodologies) and political alignment under the Belem-Addis Vision (BAV); the composition of the technical task force; the future trajectory of the BAIs given the uncertainties in their current drafting; and the interplay between the BAR and the BAV, potentially utilizing workshops to foster strategic orchestration among these moving pieces.

The **Belém-Addis Vision** poses a significant challenge due to textual ambiguities regarding 'policy alignment'—both as a process and in its expected outcomes. It remains unclear whether this alignment integrates directly with the methodological work on indicators or operates as a separate track. In either scenario, critical questions arise, including regarding **stakeholder involvement**, specifically whether participation is restricted or not (see governance models 1 and 2).

Despite the uncertainties, key established elements of the BAV include:

- A two-year policy alignment process by Parties based on testing and reporting experiences;
- Technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for developing guidance for operationalizing the BAIs (by CMA9);
- Carried out by SBs;
- Establishment of a technical task force to contribute to the technical work;
- AC and LEG are invited to participate in the technical work;
- International organizations and agencies are invited to support the technical work and enhance operationalization of the BAIs through methodologies, data standards and metadata.




Regarding the **policy alignment**, debating this concept in the GGA room during the constrained Bonn sessions is unlikely to yield consensus. Furthermore, perfect alignment between national frameworks and the UAE-FGCR is neither practical nor desirable, as it would require Parties to abandon their resource-intensive national MEL systems. A more constructive approach involves countries testing the extent to which their domestic policies converge with or diverge from the global targets and BAIs. Although this exercise will generate highly valuable data for this year's BTR2, the challenge of global aggregation for the GST2 remains. Consequently, Parties should allocate dedicated time—through BAR workshops and joint sessions between adaptation and GST negotiators—to develop a common understanding of how to assess progress that accurately reflects the increasingly comprehensive and rich adaptation pathways of countries included in their adaptation-related documents.

Policy alignment under the BAV must enhance the synergy and coherence of the broader adaptation architecture rather than exacerbate fragmentation. Furthermore, while the Belém Decision calls upon organizations and donors to support stakeholder testing according to their respective capabilities, the governance model overseen by the technical task force should proactively facilitate more inclusive stakeholder engagement in political and technical processes (see governance model 2).

In a similar vein, the role of **climate science** must be clarified. The IPCC will contribute to this process by updating its 1994 Technical Guidance for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations. Additionally, the Expert Meeting on Methodologies, Metrics, and Indicators held in Accra this March facilitated vital exchanges among experts and authors regarding the IPCC's work on metrics across multiple arenas, including UNFCCC negotiations. While maintaining the distinct identities and processes of both the IPCC and the UNFCCC, annual high-level joint check-ins through SB chairs could be established to review mutual progress.

Another critical component of policy alignment is the **role of National Adaptation Plans**, both as a process and a product. NAPs are the primary instruments reflecting the iterative adaptation cycle at the national level. They serve as substantive inputs to achieving the GGA—with its target and associated indicators—and to assessing collective progress. Methodological work should therefore be linked to NAP development and implementation, acknowledging the barriers countries face in updating and implementing them (UNEP, 2025). To ensure this, the Terms of Reference (ToRs), modalities and governance modalities should incorporate this component from the outset.



Working modalities should also ensure full articulation with the **finance negotiation rooms**. The technical and methodological work on all BAIs—particularly those related to finance—should be fully cognizant of the debates and mandates surrounding the NCQG, the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3 Trillion, Articles 2.1.c and 9 of the Paris Agreement, doubling and tripling adaptation finance, and the mandated support of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environmental Facility (GEF), and Adaptation Fund (AF) for the implementation of the UAE-FGCR, as per the Belém Decision (para 17-19). Particularly, the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 2025 reaffirming binding legal obligations by countries, including financial ones, should be taken into serious consideration.

A primary concern regarding the **BAV process** is the potential recurrence of the 2025 scenario, characterised by a structural disconnect between the expert-led technical process and the political negotiation track. This fragmentation risks producing an outcome where Parties negotiate alterations that compromise the integrity of the original technical proposal. Furthermore, within the current geopolitical climate, this dynamic sends a detrimental message regarding the science-policy interface, threatening to erode over three decades of progress in bridging these two spheres within the global climate regime.

In terms of the **BAV outcome**, the Belém Decision mandates that technical and methodological efforts produce guidance for operationalising the BAIs by CMA9. However, this output should be contextualised within the broader mandates assigned to UNFCCC bodies, as well as the upcoming GST process. Significant questions remain about how the specific mandates of Article 7.14 of the Paris Agreement will be addressed and interrelated. This is especially pertinent given that, within the GGA agenda item—and the BAV in particular—the primary focus remains squarely on reviewing overall progress toward achieving the GGA. Furthermore, it is crucial that the outcome goes beyond the technical result and can be situated in the political sphere in order to continue the winding and long road of elevating adaptation at the political level.




Figure 4. Belém-Addis Vision governance model 1 (1)





Figure 5. Belém-Addis Vision governance model 2



(1) In dialogue with <https://www.iied.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/2026-04/22701iied.pdf>



The **bucket of mandates** is completed by the broader mandate map (Table 1 and Figure 6) for UNFCCC bodies and programmes in adaptation present in GGA decisions since 2023. One difference in Figure 3 between the bucket of mandates and other workstreams lies in understanding what is negotiated in the adaptation room (light blue) and what needs to be discussed under other agenda items (“other workstreams”). The dispersion of mandates across bodies often hinders clarity on what needs to happen and when. This it is unavoidable, given that each body or programme fulfils a distinct function within the adaptation architecture, however, ensuring their coherence and synergy is key to avoiding unnecessary duplication.

Figure 6. Mandates in GGA decisions to UNFCCC bodies and programmes

AC LEG and CGE

- Support implementation of the UAE-FGCR, provide technical guidance and prepare training materials.
- Develop recommendations on improving reporting, including MPGs, its tabular formats, training courses, integration in NAPs.

AC, LEG, LCIPP and NWP

- Exchange knowledge, experience, information and best practices.

AC and LEG

- Participate in technical work of the Belém-Addis Vision.

AC

- Analyze information of BAI in adaptation-related documents.

NWP

- Recognition of key role in responding knowledge needs.

GCF, GEF and AF

- Support implementation of the UAE-FGCR and alignment with NAPs and MEL systems.

GCF and AF

- Provide updates on activities to support implementation of the UAE-FGCR.

SCF

- Takes into account UAE-FGCR into its work plan.
- Prepare reports on doubling adaptation finance.







Table 1. Mandates constituted bodies in GGA decisions

- Decision 2/CMA.5. Para 35. AF and GCF to provide updates on activities to support the implementation of the UAE-FGCR.
- Decision 2/CMA.5. Para 36. SCF takes into account the UAE-FGCR in its work plan.
- Decision 2/CMA.5. Para 44. AC, CGE and LEG to support the implementation of the UAE-FGCR with technical guidance and training materials.
- Decision 2/CMA.5. Para 45. AC, in collaboration with CGE and LEG, to develop recommendations on how to improve reporting on adaptation action and progress, including with a view to informing the review and update of the MPGs, and the review of the training course referred to in decision 9/CMA.4, paragraph 10.
- Decision 3/CMA.6. Para 33. Importance of the exchange of knowledge, experience and information and sharing of best practices pertaining to the targets, including through the work of the AC, LEG, LCIPP, other bodies and the NWP.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 14. AC, CGE and LEG provide technical guidance and support to parties for implementing UAE-FGCR and reporting, such as tabular formats of MPGs, integration in NAPs, regional and local plans.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 15. AC to analyse the information on targets in BTRs, AdComs, NAPs, NDCs and NC to assess progress.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 20. Recognize the role of NWP in responding to knowledge needs in relation to UAE-FGCR.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 17. Invites GEF to support developing countries in implementing the UAE-FGCR, including through CBIT.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 18. Invites GCF to support developing countries in implementing the UAE-FGCR, and its alignment with NAPs and MEL systems, as part of its Readiness Programme.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 19. Invites AF to support developing countries in implementing the UAE-FGCR, and its alignment with NAPs and MEL systems.
- Decision 12/CMA.7 Para 24. AC and LEG to participate in the technical work of para 23 (Belém-Addis Abeba Vision to improve metadata and methodologies of BAI for consideration at COP32).





Aligning the 2026-2028 mandates within the broader picture and across the UNFCCC’s constituted bodies is critical for an effective and successful adaptation architecture.

AC, LEG and CGE have been requested to provide technical guidance on implementing the framework and recommendations to improve reporting, such as the Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPGs) of Biennial Transparency Reports and tabular formats. The AC was also mandated to update the supplementary guidance for the Adaptation Communications (AdComs) to ensure it remains fit for purpose in line with the revision of the guidance included in Decision 9/CMA.1. This work was expected to happen in 2025 (Decision 9/CMA.1), but its timeframe has been reconsidered, linking to the MPGs that would be reviewed and updated no later than 2028 (Decision 18/CMA.1). Unlike the AdCom supplementary guidance, the MPGs for preparing BTRs already refer to the GGA, but do not yet include the UAE-FGCR. These adjustment and review processes will necessarily need to be in dialogue, ensuring communication and reporting flows are coherent and technically robust.

These processes will coincide in time with the BAV, comprising the methodological work, the political alignment and the testing of indicators. The testing face will provide valuable data on the usability of BAI, as appropriate and relevant to national circumstances. Since the methodological work is expected to be delivered by a technical task force by COP32/CMA9, **SB64 (June 2026) should agree on the task force’s mandate, composition, and modalities**, making it operational as soon as possible in the second half of the year. AC and LEG are also invited to participate in the technical work. This could be accomplished through the provision of inputs or by participating directly in the technical task force (different governance models).

While additional refinement of indicators will be needed, this should not be viewed as a barrier to implementing the UAE-FGCR and starting the testing exercise. Different Parties and stakeholders have initiated consultations among their constituencies. In this tone, the second round of BTRs **represents a significant "window of opportunity" for Parties to engage in early implementation and testing in articulation with national monitoring systems.** This approach allows for identifying data gaps and capacity constraints, thereby transforming the indicators into functional tools for implementation even before their final methodological maturation.



The **BAV and the BAR processes and activities will provide inputs** for the first phase, “information collection and preparation” (Nov 2026 - 2028) and the second phase, “technical assessment” (2027 -2028) of the **GST2**. The **AC mandate to analyse BAI** information included in adaptation-related documents is expected to be a key input for reviewing progress in achieving the GGA in the GST.

The mandates also recognize **the role of the Nairobi Work Programme in responding to knowledge needs and supporting the exchange of knowledge, experiences, and best practices**. However, it should be noted that the NWP operates with very limited funding and is assigned many tasks annually by the Parties. Some of these tasks are not carried out due to funding and human resources issues. It is crucial that the structure of the Secretariat and the UNFCCC bodies can be sustained so that the mandates achieved can be fulfilled.

The challenge of monitoring adaptation issues arising in other negotiation rooms has been consistently problematic because negotiators in those other issues often fail to assign them the necessary priority and/or lack the context of the adaptation room. In this case, it is crucial in the **finance rooms to monitor the mandates of the funds**—GCF, GEF, and AF—to implement the UAE-FGCR and support alignment with NAPs and MEL systems. Similarly, the SCF's role in incorporating the UAE-FGCR into its work plan and linking it to its doubling adaptation finance report, delayed to 2028, using the BAI's means of implementation indicators, is essential. Other key issues include the relationship with Article 2.1.c and Article 9, the implementation of the NCQG and the 1.3 trillion roadmap, and progress toward tripling adaptation finance. All these aspects cannot be decoupled from the targets and their indicators; rather, they must serve the purpose of monitoring progress and achieving accelerated implementation of adaptation, in accordance with the obligations assumed.








Figure 7. Timeline for articulating adaptation mandates during 2026 - 2028





3.1.1 The Baku Adaptation Roadmap



The BAR is, by design, a roadmap -not a separate or standalone process such as a dialogue, framework, body, or work programme (Bueno et al., 2025). It should bring coherence to the UNFCCC adaptation architecture, avoid duplication of work, and focus on implementing the GGA (Para 26 of Decision 12/CMA.7). In this context, activities under the BAR should be addressed by Parties under the GGA agenda item, in line with the implementation of the UAE-FGCR. These activities comprise a first phase from 2026 to 2028, focusing on the initial implementation of activities, the establishment of two workshops per year, organised by the SB Chairs with the support of the secretariat, and the preparation of a technical paper by the secretariat.

Additionally, Belém’s decision invited submissions by 28 February 2026 on the focus of the BAR workshops and the technical paper. By 20th April, 5 groups (LDCs, Arab Group, EU, SUR & AILAC, AOSIS) 8 countries (Canada, Mauritius, Russian Federation, Norway, India, Brazil, United Kingdom and Japan), the Holy See, along with 4 UN system organizations (WMO, UNICEF, UNICEF on behalf of Water Climate Pavillion and OCHA), 2 IGOs (OECD and CDRI) and 3 admitted NGOs or coalition of organizations (CLARE, Latam Task Force on Adaptation and a coalition of Brazilian NGOs) submitted their views on the focus of the workshops. An assessment of submissions made with strategic action points is presented below.

From submissions, it is clear that Parties and groups are still reflecting on how to unpack a complex decision and proposed ideas on how every piece intersects with the others. Thus, it is possible to identify **two interpretations** of the role of the BAR in connection with other pieces: on the one hand, the **BAR as a distinct and clearly separated with no overlap with indicator refinement, but complementary to the BAV** (Arab Group); and on the other hand, the **BAR as the thread of the adaptation architecture**, that will ensure coherence, complementarity, and avoiding duplication with existing UNFCCC bodies and processes (LDCs, Canada, EU, SUR/AILAC, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, Japan and AOSIS). The latter includes supporting the implementation of the BAI to achieve the BAV. For these processes to be successfully performed, aligned with all Parties' political expectations and grounded in science, it is key to reach a common understanding of their roles. In Brazil’s view, the BAV should provide a dedicated space for technical and political alignment to operationalize the BAI, alongside the technical task force. Whereas the BAR is the vehicle for advancing the broader implementation-oriented dimensions of the GGA, helping consolidate the progress made and addressing the remaining gaps.






BAR workshops and technical papers should complement the technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the BAI under the BAV, led by the BAI task force, and vice versa. AOSIS states that the BAR is not the space for establishing, advancing, or consolidating indicator reporting obligations, expectations, or norms. That work belongs, unambiguously, to the BAV technical process and the technical task force. In addition, the United Kingdom and Japan stressed that the BAR should not operate as a standalone process or create parallel negotiating tracks.

There were views **linking the GGA targets with the NAPs, the BTR submission and the GST2 process** (LDCs, SUR/AILAC, Mauritius, AOSIS); and also to the **support required for implementing the GGA and the UAE-FGCR in national contexts** (Canada, Norway, Russian Federation, Japan).

Perspectives on the overall **purpose and design of the workshops:** several Parties and groups (LDCs, Mauritius, Canada, AOSIS) emphasized an action-oriented and practical approach focused on implementation. Some see these as spaces for peer learning, the exchange of best practices, and collaborative problem-solving (Canada, EU, Norway, Japan), while others (LDCs, SUR/AILAC) argue they should be intentionally designed to feed into formal processes, such as GST2 and ongoing negotiations, rather than serving as standalone discussions.

Strong convergence on **inclusivity and broad participation** (Indigenous Peoples, civil society, practitioners, youth, elders, and afro-descendants) (Canada, EU, Norway, Brazil); **hybrid formats** (SUR/AILAC, United Kingdom), **alignment with existing events** (NAP Expo, Climate Weeks) (Canada, EU); and **avoiding duplication with existing UNFCCC workstreams** (Canada, EU, LDCs, United Kingdom and Brazil). In terms of topics, a wide range has been presented (Table 2).

Table 2. Synthesis of topics suggested by Parties and groups on the workshops' topics





Topic	Description	Groups and Parties
Coherence & architecture alignment	Mapping mandates, enhancing coordination, and aligning adaptation architecture	LDCs, EU, SUR/AILAC, Norway, United Kingdom, Japan
GGA operationalisation & national integration	Embedding GGA targets/BAI indicators into NAPs, BTRs, and national planning cycles, approaches to adaptation, including transformational, transboundary aspects of the adaptation targets	LDCs, Mauritius, SUR/AILAC, Canada, Norway, EU, India, AOSIS, Brazil, United Kingdom, Japan
GST2 linkages & global progress assessment	Ensuring adaptation inputs to GST2 and improving the measurement and aggregation of progress	LDCs, SUR/AILAC, United Kingdom
Means of Implementation & finance	Scaling finance (including tripling adaptation finance), improving access, and aligning flows with GGA	Mauritius, LDCs, Arab Group, SUR/AILAC, Russian Federation, AOSIS, India
Adaptation cycle & implementation	Planning, implementation, MEL, enabling factors	Canada, EU, Norway
Risk, vulnerability & temperature context	Addressing adaptation adequacy under temperature goals; impact, vulnerability, and risk assessment (practical experiences & regional approaches)	Arab Group, Russian Federation, EU, India
Innovation, private sector & knowledge systems	Innovative finance, technologies, private sector engagement, and indigenous/local knowledge integration	Canada, EU, Mauritius, AOSIS, Japan

On the **technical paper** mandated in paragraph 29 of decision 12/CMA.7, aimed at enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening cooperation and facilitating adaptation planning and implementation in line with different national circumstances and in the context of Article 2, paragraph 1(a), of the Paris Agreement, there is convergence that the document must be a **practical, solution-oriented, and implementation-focused instrument**.

It is important to define the role of the technical paper within the context of the complexity of previous and new mandates arising from Belem. Thus, several Parties and groups referred to the primary role as **synthesising and clearly mapping adaptation-related work** completed and underway under the UNFCCC, and identifying complementarities and linkages across mandates (Canada, Mauritius, LDC, European Union, AOSIS, United Kingdom and Brazil). SUR and AILAC submission shares a similar perspective but with a specific focus on how the various components of the adaptation



architecture and Article 7.14 of the Paris Agreement can **contribute to assessing collective adaptation progress in GST2**. A quite different view is provided by the Arab Group and India, which foresees a report offering **analysis, clear options, and solutions for operationalising adequate adaptation responses in the context of the temperature goal**. India specifies that any guidance on metadata and methodologies should remain non-prescriptive and optional. Other Parties (Russia, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom) see the technical paper as building on the **synthesis of insights emerging from the workshops**. Japan proposes substantive attention to **transformational adaptation** based on concrete country experiences. In addition, Brazil proposes a component of recommendations for the subsequent phases of the BAR.

Furthermore, some Parties explicitly referred to **means of implementation (MOI)**, a topic of the technical paper, including specific methodologies to track MOI indicators (Mauritius), synthesis of MOI gaps and needs that constrain Parties' ability to implement the GGA (LDCs), financing implications of temperature-responsive adaptation and estimating the scale of needs under different warming pathways (Arab Group). AOSIS stresses that improved planning support must be matched by improved finance delivery, while India views MOI as a central pillar of the paper's focus. In addition, Mauritius specifically suggested that the paper could elaborate on how the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) could be streamlined to finance countries' adaptation needs.

Regarding the **timeline**, and due to the diverging views on the technical paper's role, some groups called for its publication at least six weeks prior to COP31 (Arab Group); at least four weeks before CMA.8 (United Kingdom); no later than three weeks before the opening of each workshop (LDCs), before the workshops to inform discussions (EU), in September 2026 to feed the third workshop in 2027 (SUR and AILAC).

Finally, even though views on the technical taskforce was not an element of the submission call, one submission (SUR and AILAC) explicitly provided details on its mandate and composition. The mandate will be to contribute to technical work -aligned with the BAR- to improve the metadata and methodologies of the BAI, and to provide recommendations for consideration by the Parties at COP32. Concerning composition, the group emphasised a balanced membership from developed and developing country Parties (according to UNFCCC constituencies), as well as members representing UNFCCC non-governmental constituencies; and, upon convening a new group of experts based on the list of experts of the UAE-Belém Work Programme, to ensure balanced representation across thematic sectors.





BOX 1. Civil society views on the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR)

The BAR is perceived as a pivotal transition phase, marking the shift from the formalisation of **adaptation ambition to its technical operationalisation** (Water for Climate Pavilion) and the progression from "**dialogue to delivery**" (Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority"). It is viewed as a strategic vehicle for implementing the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, specifically by aligning adaptation responses with the Paris Agreement's temperature goals and by scaling access to means of implementation (OECD).

Proposed **workshop topics** include synergies and coherence within the adaptation architecture and the articulation with the second Global Stocktake (Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority"), mobilising private sector engagement and investment (OECD), integrating disaster-resilient infrastructure (CDRI), and applying indicators within fragility, conflict, and violence contexts (OCHA). Organisations also emphasise adaptation finance (Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority"), centring child-responsive outcomes (UNICEF) and the reduction of environmental racism and historical inequalities (Geledés).

Regarding **modalities** of the workshops, submissions call for a balance between negotiated and non-negotiated formats (Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority") that guarantee the inclusive participation of non-state actors, civil society, frontline communities, and the technical experts who led previous work programmes (Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority", Geledés).

The **technical paper** to be prepared by the Secretariat is viewed not as a mere knowledge product, but as a functional instrument for implementation (Geledés). It should provide conceptual clarity on adaptation targets (Water for Climate Pavilion) and offer specific guidelines for disaggregating data by gender, race, age, and geography (Geledés, Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority", UNICEF). Furthermore, organisations suggest the paper should demonstrate how indicators can be effectively integrated into national planning cycles and reporting frameworks (Water for Climate Pavilion, Task-Force "Adaptation as a Priority"). This approach ensures that cross-cutting considerations, such as human rights and social vulnerabilities, are fundamentally embedded in the measurement of global adaptation progress (Geledés, UNICEF).

3.1.2 The orchestration of adaptation architecture


The idea of orchestration in governance models refers to the relationship between the orchestrator and intermediate actors or intermediaries that influence processes and policies. In the climate change regime complex, orchestration comprises public actors - such as governments- and a wide variety of non governmental actors, including NGOs, private sector, academia, as well as subnational actors, cities and international organizations. Thus, orchestration allows bottom-up as well as top-down initiatives, replication of efforts and, ultimately, strengthening polycentric governance from a horizontal perspective (Abbott & Snidal, 2010; Abbott, 2012; Hale & Roger, 2014; Biermann et al., 2009; Dzebo, 2019).





The concept of orchestration is highly relevant to the current global adaptation architecture, which is characterized by overlapping mandates and diverse actors operating outside the direct purview of the UNFCCC. However, these disparate efforts can be strategically aligned with the frameworks developed within this forum. The adaptation community is at a critical juncture to evaluate how the Belém Decision and other key adaptation mandates can be synergistically linked. Doing so will amplify both individual and collective efforts to achieve the targets of the UAE-FGCR and the GGA, while ensuring that the specific adaptation goals of all actors contribute meaningfully to collective global progress (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Orchestrating the complexity of the adaptation architecture



3.2 National Adaptation Plans


National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) are a key pillar of the UNFCCC adaptation architecture and the main instrument for Parties to adequately diagnose and act on climate impacts and risks. The previous assessments of the NAP process took place in 2015 and 2018, and in 2021, COP 26 requested SBI 60 to initiate the third assessment. After three years of unsuccessful deliberation among Parties, COP30 concluded this task. The decision reflected some progress -to date, 76 countries have submitted at least one NAP-, but also recognised important challenges, gaps and needs in the process of formulating and implementing NAPs.

Adaptation approaches (2) have been at the centre of discussions for years. Their consideration in all the stages of the policy cycle is fundamental to ensuring effective and inclusive adaptation policies. Addressing this topic also entails considering the different ways Parties understand the realities in which adaptation occurs, including diverse cultural, social, institutional, and legal approaches, as well as the evolving realities and methodological and technical improvements in adaptation policies. In this context, Belem's decision on NAPs recognised the importance of **gender-responsive approaches** in adaptation action. This takes place in a context in which countries across the world are moving towards more conservative paradigms. Moreover, **ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions** are both mentioned, along with **traditional, Indigenous Peoples', and local knowledge systems**.

Over the last years, several interpretations of some approaches being more relevant than others have emerged in several negotiating rooms, including the GGA. To avoid further polarisation and to demonstrate multilateral outcomes on the ground, NAPs should be supported for the implementation of GGA targets, as well as its cross-cutting considerations. The agreed **technical** paper -prepared by the LEG and the AC- on how the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are integrating different adaptation approaches into the NAPs will be an important insight for this, and it's expected that this showcases experiences from several regions.

The decision also stressed the importance of creating synergies and integrating adaptation into relevant development plans and processes at the national, subnational, local, and sectoral levels, recognising the

(2) These are linked to the guiding principles, established in Decision 5/CP.17, paragraphs 3 and 4.






multilevel and multisectoral nature of adaptation. This is key for avoiding further fragmentation, and needs to be translated into concrete activities and outcomes on the ground through multilevel governance. It will also contribute to achieving all the targets of the GGA, such as mainstreaming considerations.

Means of implementation, particularly finance, have been the main source of disagreement under this agenda item, which stalled discussions. Developing countries emphasised the need to link progress in NAP processes with the provision of financial, technological, and capacity-building support, while developed countries favoured broader references to enabling conditions. Emerging divergences are also related to specific groups' needs and circumstances, specifically the LDCs and SIDS. The cost of getting this agenda item out of stagnation was limited results on means of implementation. The LEG, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee and the Standing Committee on Finance, will prepare a compilation of **climate finance flow overviews** to inform and implement NAPs. This information will be reflected in the 2026 NAP progress report and could provide substantive input for the session's conclusions.

The decision also highlights the **complexities of accessing climate finance**, which **hinders progress, including towards achieving the GGA**. This is relevant, since COP30 also recognised the NAPs as an important channel for achieving the UAE-FGCR targets. Additionally, decision 12/CMA.7 established that the adopted Belém Adaptation Indicators are intended to inform national approaches to tracking adaptation action and progress. This opened up a space for further elaboration on the **“how”** this can be done through the NAPs, given this bidirectional relationship, the NAPs landing the targets while also being informed by the BAIs, and **“what”** would be needed for this to be effective. The OECD (2026) identified two complementary approaches: engaging with the GGA targets, e.g. by identifying those targets and target sub-components that reflect domestic adaptation priorities in NAPs or other policy instruments; and engaging in early testing of the Belém Adaptation Indicators, e.g. to explore data availability, feasibility and clarity of concepts, in line with national adaptation priorities and circumstances (p.11). The proposal presented in governance model 2 included in this report incorporates, as a result of the BAV's work, the development of recommendations on this dual GGA-NAPs path.





Moreover, the articulation between NAPs as instruments for achieving the targets should also be understood in the context of the new adaptation finance goal (NCQG). COP 30 Mutirão decision called for countries to **at least triple adaptation finance by 2035**. Setting aside discussions on its insufficiency to close the adaptation finance gap—estimated between USD 284 billion and USD 339 billion per year by the Adaptation Gap Report (UNEP, 2025), the challenge currently is **translating the new pledge to concrete delivery to meet the targets**, and whether it is or not, aligned with the support required for the GGA implementation.

3.3 The Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change

The Nairobi Work Programme (NWP), established in 2005, supports Parties in strengthening their understanding and assessment of climate impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation — enabling evidence-based decisions on practical adaptation measures. As the primary mechanism for addressing knowledge gaps, the NWP responds to needs raised by Parties and those emerging from the implementation of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, alongside related Convention workstreams and bodies.

The NWP is structured around several work areas, issues addressing themes and cross-cuttings, and modalities⁽³⁾. At SB62, in occasion of the consideration of its work and workplan activities' progress, draft conclusions included important elements, such as: **strengthen collaboration with diverse knowledge holders**, including scientific institutions, Indigenous Peoples and local communities; be inclusive in terms of **adaptation approaches, delivering knowledge and expertise in the process of NAP formulation and implementation**; in a regionally balanced manner. Regarding the **GGA and the implementation of the UAE-FGCR**, the NWP's role was emphasised in **facilitating the exchange of knowledge, experience and information, and the sharing of best practices pertaining to the targets**. This role should be acknowledged under the BAR to enhance coherence and complementarity within the adaptation architecture. The NWP has a network of more than 450 partners which could provide strong support for implementing the Framework at several levels.

(3) **Work areas:** Impacts and vulnerability and adaptation planning, measures, and actions. Sub-working areas: methods and tools; data and observations; climate modelling, scenarios and downscaling; climate related risks and extreme events; socio-economic information; adaptation planning and practices; research; technologies for adaptation, and economic diversification.



In SB64 it would be desirable to further clarify the role of the NWP by providing support in the implementation of the UAE-FGCR and supporting the closing of knowledge gaps associated with the BAV and the technical task force.

3.4 Review of the progress, effectiveness and performance of the Adaptation Committee

The constituent bodies of the UNFCCC are periodically reviewed in accordance with their mandates. A legal-political conflict arose over whether bodies receiving guidance from the COP/CMP should also receive guidance from the CMA, with the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. In general, developed countries have promoted the interpretation that the Agreement is independent of the UNFCCC, which has led to objections from the Global South due to differences in the annexes and the responsibilities they entail. The reviews of the bodies became the main arena of dispute, because deciding which supreme body leads and participates in the review may imply acceptance of one interpretation or the other. Thus, AC review has been stalled for five years.

The COP30 presidency proposed postponing the issue to SB64 given the burden of the agenda in Belem. Thus, in Bonn, the postponement may be repeated or an attempt may be made to continue the discussions. Beyond the issue of **governance** that transcends the AC, it must be considered that this debate has impacted the **reputation** of the AC when it comes to dealing with sensitive adaptation mandates. This reputational damage can be reversed, and it is worth mentioning as an opportunity that **the AC has been given some of the most significant mandates associated with providing support for the implementation of the UAE-FGCR.**

Themes and crosscuttings: Ecosystems;human settlements;water resources; health;extreme weather events;oceans, coastal areas & ecosystems;drought, water scarcity, and land degradation neutrality;agriculture and food security;slow onset events;forests and grasslands;wetlands;rural systems and communities;cities/urban systems;livelihood and socioeconomic dimensions;gender issues;indigenous and traditional knowledge;impacts on ecosystems.

Modalities: Workshops and meetings (including the Focal Point Forums);expertise and input from experts, practitioners and relevant organizations; compendiums and web-based resources (including Adaptation knowledge portal);targeted submissions from Parties and organizations;reports, technical papers, and assessments;other modalities, such as a group(s) of experts, upon agreement by the SBSTA. Information in <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/nairobi-work-programme-nwp/overview-of-the-nairobi-work-programme#Work-areas-and-modalities-at-a-glance->





3.4 Guidance relating to adaptation communications

Adaptation Communications were established in Article 7.10 of the Paris Agreement, they include priorities, implementation and support needs, plans and measures. These communications may, in accordance with Article 7.11, be submitted as a component of other communications or documents, for example, a NAP, an NDC, a national communication, or in conjunction with them.

Decision 9/CMA.1 established guidance for preparing an Adaptation Communication (AdComs) and incorporates Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs) as another possible channel or vehicle for submitting AdComs. This decision was negotiated and adopted at the same time as MPGs of BTRs. This has made the trajectory of both documents comparable, despite the technical differences in the guidelines. The MPGs are focused on *ex-post* reporting, while the AdCom guidance are open to both *ex-ante* communication, in line with the NDC, and *ex-post* reporting, including BTRs and other instruments. The decision also establishes that the guidance will be evaluated in 2025 and revised if necessary.

Considerations at SB62 in June 2025, adopted in Belém as Decision 4/CMA.7 recognized the complementarity between different adaptation-related documents such as AdComs, NAPs, NDCs, BTRs and NCs. It also recognised the value of the supplementary guidance developed by the Adaptation Committee on Adaptation Communications, that will be finally available in UN languages after a long discussion.

Considering the number and complexity of adaptation agenda items in 2025, it was not possible to review the guidance in 2025. It was also discussed at SB62 that the review required the maturation and progress of other items, including the GGA and NAPs. Furthermore, some Parties raised the need to maintain parallel review processes with the MPGs after 2028. The number of submissions on the use of the guidance was also insufficient, thus, it was considered that the extension of the deadline for submissions could improve the assessment.

There are different activities for consideration at SB64: **scope, process and deadlines** (who, how and when the review will take place), the linkage with the **GST process, the review of MPGs of BTRs**, and other adaptation agenda items, including **GGA BAV and BAR**.



4. Challenges and opportunities toward SB64

4.1 Traffic light assessment


An initial traffic light assessment has been prepared based on the main elements derived from the 12/CMA.7 decision adopted in Belém. This exercise seeks to help countries and stakeholders identify potential strategic steps and key issues for a draft decision to inform conversations in the incoming workshop and formal negotiations at SB 64 in Bonn.

As reflected in BAR submissions and informal conversations between Parties and group representatives, efforts are underway to unpack a complex decision and clarify interlinkages, but a shared understanding of the overall architecture and Antalya's **decision structure** is still emerging (**yellow**). It is key to consider that COP31 cannot be just a stepping stone to COP32; there are important mandates and processes that require follow-up and adjustments along the way.

The **Belem-Addis Vision** (**yellow**) comprises the operationalization of the Belem Adaptation Indicators, as well as testing and reporting on BAI's use by Parties and the technical task force. Bonn will be key in demonstrating that the Parties are willing to turn the page on past frustrations and move decisively forward with the technical and political work towards COP31 and COP32. Specific considerations regarding the task force, the BAV process, outcomes, and its relationship to the broader adaptation architecture are included in section 3.

As regards the **BAR** (**yellow**), there is general agreement on its nature: it is not a standalone process but a roadmap aimed at ensuring coherence and avoiding duplication as reflected in Decision 12/CMA.7. However, Parties and groups have different interpretations on how this interacts with other tracks, particularly the BAV. In this sense, the proposal of workshops expected from the SB chairs would clarify BAR topics and formats - based also on submissions-, as well as their thematic linkage with the BAV, the BAI and other items of the adaptation architecture.

Considering the submissions in relation to the **BAR technical paper** (**yellow**), some commonalities were identified in its practical, implementation-oriented approach, but significant divergences remain regarding its function (mapping/synthesis vs analytical vs solution-oriented outputs).



The second round of **BTRs** is taking place in 2026 (**green**), and even with the gaps and obstacles that countries may face in providing specific information on the GGA and the UAE-FGCR, it should be noted that the vast majority of BTR1 -90%- already included adaptation chapters and components (UNFCCC, 2025), and many have already begun linking with the UAE-FGCR, even without guidance on how to do so. It is expected that BTR2 will represent a further step, where the Parties can also reflect on BAI testing exercises.

The GGA's decisions consistently acknowledge that the **linkage GGA-GST (yellow)** is key, as outlined in the Paris Agreement. Given that the first stage of GST2 begins this year, opportunities for negotiation and workshop discussions will need to be found, as some Parties have indicated in their submissions. These forums will provide a platform to discuss how to incorporate additional information and what mechanisms will be established for collectively assessing GGA progress, considering the current state of the indicators and the tasks that remain to be completed.

Some proposals in submissions referred to **the linkage with NAPs (yellow)**, but there is no clear “how” for this articulation, and a coherent operational approach must be further explored. A proposal on the how has been made in section 3.

Submissions also include some commonalities on the relevance of the **role of stakeholders (green)** in terms of broad inclusivity for both the BAV and the BAR. Nevertheless, more specificity is needed on their roles (e.g., custodian organisations, subnational governments, etc.).

On several **mandates given to constituted bodies and programmes (yellow)**, it is key to assess its progress and the interlinkages between them and the implementation of the UAE-FGCR. However, often the multiplicity of mandates and negotiation rooms prevails over their interconnectedness. GGA decision could be an opportunity to demonstrate coherence and synergy among them, favoring orchestration over fragmentation.

Finally, **means of implementation (yellow)** is a critical classic bottleneck; several countries and groups have proposed in their submissions addressing this from different angles, but without providing a specific format for a related outcome: including methodological tracking of MOI indicators, estimating financial needs under different warming scenarios, linking with the NCQG, engaging the private sector, and exploring innovative instruments. As regards **financial provisions to the funds and the SCF**, particularly paragraphs 17 to 19 of decision 12/CMA.7, while these discussions occur in other agenda items, and some countries jealously guard the boundaries between negotiating rooms, it should be acknowledged that finance negotiators may be unaware of the context of negotiating an item that originates in an adaptation room and ends up in a finance room. Therefore, overcoming these boundaries and establishing joint monitoring of the evolution of these mandates by both rooms is critical.





Table 3. Traffic light assessment

<p>GREEN There is some kind of rapprochement</p> <p>YELLOW There is no approach yet but it is not impossible</p> <p>RED Still a long way off, should be assessed as to whether it is feasible</p>	Structure of the decision	Yellow
	Belem-Addis Vision: guidance for operationalizing Belem Adaptation Indicators	Yellow
	Belem-Addis Vision: testing and reporting exercise by parties	Yellow
	Belem-Addis Vision: Technical Task Force	Yellow
	Baku Adaptation Roadmap	Yellow
	BAR technical paper	Yellow
	Reporting exercise: A-BTR	Green
	Linkage with NAPs	Yellow
	Linkage with GST	Yellow
	Role of stakeholders	Green
	Progress of relevant mandates: NWP, AC, CGE, LEG	Yellow
	Means of Implementation, including SCF, GCF, GEF, AF mandates	Yellow





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