María del Pilar Bueno holds a PhD in International Relations (UNR) | Researcher at CONICET.
She has served as a climate change negotiator at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and as a member of the UNFCCC Adaptation Committee from 2017 to 2021, co-chairing the committee in 2018 and 2019. She is the former Secretary of Climate Change for Argentina. She coordinates the Argentine Foreign Policy Observatory at the National University of Rosario (UNR), co-directs the Center for Political and Social Studies (CEPAS) at the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of UNR, and coordinates the Department of Environment and Development at the Institute of International Relations (National University of La Plata). She teaches undergraduate and graduate courses at the National University of Rosario and other universities in Argentina.
A leading figure in her fields of study, Pilar spoke with Abro Hilo about climate change and environmental policy.
Agustina Jacobo [AJ]: First of all, I'd like to ask you about the national environmental agenda. Could you give a brief overview of the domestic environmental situation?
Pilar Bueno [PB]: Thank you very much. I think that when discussing the environmental agenda in Argentina, it's necessary to refer to the production model, and in that sense, when we talk about the production model, there's necessarily a strong link to the extractive model or extractivism. This has generated, and continues to generate, various debates in Argentina regarding the relevance of the old discussion "environment and development." When we analyze the situation, we see that two-thirds of the land in Argentina suffers the impact of desertification, which can be explained by a series of factors, including, of course, the adverse effects of climate change, pre-existing conditions, but also, and very especially, the practices and land use for livestock and agricultural purposes, in some cases unsustainable, and the expansion of the agricultural frontier, which has resulted in continuous deforestation. Organizations estimate that 8 million hectares have been deforested in the last three decades. We have a Native Forest Law, which is a great instrument, but at the same time, there are still, to this day, strong debates regarding its implementation, its underfunding or inadequate financing, as well as non-compliance with the law in general. Of course, the adverse effects of climate change are having a very strong impact on everything we are discussing, and this has become very clear to us in the convergence of international and national scientific work regarding this development model; climate change acts as a kind of catalyst for all these dynamics. Thus, the extractive development model is the engine of ecosystem degradation and has serious consequences for biodiversity, and at the same time, climate change exacerbates these conditions by limiting the time available for adaptation and amplifying the dynamics of degradation. So there is an all-encompassing dynamic, or a vicious cycle, at play. And within the adverse effects of climate change, there is a wealth of accumulated scientific knowledge in Argentina: the increase in heat waves, the reduction in cold days, the rise in sea level, the impact on glaciers, the greater risk of water scarcity and water stress, especially in areas that already have natural characteristics, such as the Cuyo region, and of course, an increase in extreme weather events, phenomena that we see internationally and that we also see in Argentina. In fact, all of this is extremely well-documented, not only by grassroots organizations, but also as part of Argentina's publicly available information. We see this in the second national communication on adaptation in the national contribution that our country submitted in December to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, where the main vulnerabilities are identified. To conclude this question, I think it's important to emphasize that environmental issues cannot be viewed in isolation. The production and development model is definitely intertwined with the environmental debate and all its dynamics; Discussing the environmental agenda is discussing the development agenda, as well as discussing the ecological transition agenda. That's where we stand.
AJ: At the Climate Leaders Summit on April 22nd, Alberto Fernández announced a series of commitments related to climate change. Among the most notable are increasing the Nationally Determined Contribution by 27.7% compared to 2016 and advancing the development of renewable energy with the goal of it representing 30% of the national energy mix. Do you think the environmental policies currently being implemented align with these commitments? Where should the focus be?
PB: When discussing climate policy as public policy, it's crucial to emphasize both mitigation and adaptation. In terms of mitigation, we're referring to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing and improving carbon sinks. Adaptation, on the other hand, refers to the actions taken to adjust and prepare for the adverse effects that are already upon us and those that will continue to occur and intensify. These actions can be physical or structural, social, and institutional. Furthermore, as the mitigation gap continues to widen due to a lack of ambition, the need for adaptation will become increasingly significant. The Paris Agreement already states that less ambition in mitigation will increase adaptation costs, especially human costs—in human lives—as well as economic costs. So, why am I mentioning this? Because reducing greenhouse gas emissions, increasing carbon sinks, and implementing adaptation measures all imply a shift in development policies. In other words, how can we increase access to drinking water in a context of greater water stress? How can we reduce the rate of deforestation, the main driver of greenhouse gas emissions in Argentina? Will focusing on the protection of native forests and increasing carbon sinks be enough to limit the rise in temperature?
While there is a specific area within the national government, the Secretariat of Climate Change, which in turn serves as the technical coordinator under the Minimum Budget Law 27,520 on climate change, passed in December 2019, the implementation of this policy is a cross-cutting effort. That's why a National Climate Change Cabinet has been created, in which all agencies participate. So, where is the transition being driven from, and where is climate policy being developed? From all these areas, or it won't happen at all. Why am I telling you this? Of course, climate policy will be related to the directives, actions, policies, and strategies established by the climate change area itself. But it will also be directly related to how renewable energies are effectively integrated into energy planning and transition, among other things, which Argentina needs to focus on very quickly. This should be included in the 2050 roadmap that Argentina is expected to present at COP26. Not only that, but organizations have been raising, and we have all been raising, the need for clarity on what zero deforestation means. How does this relate to the current Native Forest Law and its effective implementation, which we discussed in the previous question? How can we achieve this without a profound discussion of the extractive development model and Argentina's role in global supply chains?
I specifically mention energy, agriculture, livestock, and deforestation because, basically, these sectors in Argentina generate 90% of our greenhouse gas emissions. We already know the drivers . In fact, the main driver is deforestation. Therefore, it is very important that when we talk about meeting the targets that Argentina submitted to the Convention in its second contribution, we pay attention to the ambition of those targets in light of the transition. At the same time, as long as Argentina does not develop its National Adaptation and Mitigation Plan, in accordance with Law 27,520, which includes all economic sectors and especially those sectors that generate 90% of our emissions, and as long as that plan clearly outlines adaptation actions, then we will remain in debt or unclear about how to fulfill what we have committed to. Argentina still owes its National Adaptation Plan, despite having received funding from the Green Climate Fund to develop it. To achieve this, coordination with different jurisdictions is essential for developing a suitable, territorially based adaptation plan. Mitigation planning allows for greater top-down coordination, but adaptation has different technical and political requirements. In other words, for us to have a coherent national adaptation plan, we need a very strong bottom-up exchange with local communities and jurisdictions.
We are waiting for the 2050 roadmap, which is the long-term strategy that Argentina has to present this year at COP26. That's where the details of how these processes, this ecological transition, and decarbonization by 2050 will be generated are supposed to appear. There we need to see the role of renewables, there we need to see adaptation planning, and there we need to see deforestation from a participatory process based on the progress of the National Adaptation and Mitigation Plan .
AJ: Continuing along these lines and speaking of Argentina's role, what is Argentina's history in international negotiations? And, considering that we are not an international power, what role does our country play today in the fight against climate change? How is Argentina positioning itself in this international arena?
PB: Climate change negotiations are concentrated primarily in the multilateral forum that is the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, one of the Rio Conventions of 1992. The negotiation process began with the first Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body, in 1995. It's difficult to summarize such a lengthy process with such a long history, but I would like to share some of the characteristics that I consider fundamental or very substantial. These include those that remain unchanged or similar to the 1995 discussions, as well as those that have evolved. This is a system in which the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities—a Rio principle that applies to all the Conventions, but is applied to each in a different way—has been the cornerstone of the entire climate change conversation. This has led us to a Convention with a system of annexes containing lists of countries with varying commitments. Therein lies the concept, which is part of the Convention through Article 4. Now, what happens? Initially, a strict distinction was applied between developed and developing countries regarding mitigation, and this had a first consequence: the first implementation process of the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, which faced many difficulties. And of course, the first obstacle was the role of the United States, which, despite having made progress with the negotiation and signing process, later withdrew its support for this initiative under the administration of George W. Bush. From there, we entered a long process of more than ten years—I would say a decade and a half—in which emissions continued to increase, adaptation policies remained weak or of low relevance, and international financing dwindled. Many of those primary objectives, unfortunately, could not be met. The negotiations leading to the Paris Agreement, with the failed Copenhagen Accord in between, raised new hope with different rules, but also with some continuities. We have an agreement that continues to respect differentiated responsibilities and the leadership that developed countries must exercise, not only in mitigation but also in providing financing, technology, and capacity building. However, it also calls on all of us to get on board with this effort, this climate action, through, of course, especially national contributions. That's why the Agreement doesn't speak of commitments but rather contributions, because this avoids reinterpreting the concept of the Convention, which remains in force. So, in this context, and addressing the second point of your question, climate negotiations are also characterized by taking place in groups: regional groups, political groups, and technical groups with different characteristics. This has been extensively studied in the literature. I think there are also distinctive elements here, because it's important to remember that Argentina has historically been part of the G77+China, which includes all or almost all developing countries. I say almost all, because, for example, Mexico, when it joined the OECD, decided to leave the G77, which was not the case for Chile. Furthermore, there are some other developing countries, such as Tuvalu, among others, that are not part of the G77+China. But we have 134 of the 197 Parties. That is, two-thirds of the Convention. Argentina has always been part of this group and has led it on certain issues. Argentina has led the adaptation negotiations within the G77 plus China on two historical occasions. It did so between Cancún and Durban, from 2010 to 2011, and again in the process following Paris, from 2016 to 2018. Argentina's role in this process is not without reason.
If Argentina and the world were to enter a phase of extremely ambitious mitigation efforts today—which isn't happening, but if it were—Argentina and other countries would have to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change for decades. So, this isn't an "or" problem; it's an "and" problem. It's true that, when it comes to allocating scarce resources in terms of financing, technology, and international policy attention, developed countries have been much more proactive in promoting adaptation at the domestic level. But the truth is that developing countries, in general, and Argentina in particular, have needed that support for international cooperation on adaptation, not only in terms of financing, technology, and addressing shortcomings, but also politically, to highlight the need for adaptation at the domestic level. This also seems very significant to me. In terms of other agendas, I believe there is an increasing participation of Argentina in the negotiations, especially on technical matters, with more negotiators from various agencies, particularly governmental ones. We still need much more cooperation with science in Argentina, much more cooperation with other organizations, and with the private sector. But it is clear, when one looks at the participation or evolution of the Argentine negotiating team—and this is an analysis we are conducting with the Argentina 1.5 Project team—that there has indeed been an increase in the participation of agencies, as well as a numerical increase. This is an international trend. So it's not just an Argentine case. It's an international trend that Argentina is also joining, albeit to a comparatively lesser extent. And in that sense, it's commendable that the country has submitted a large number of documents to the Convention and continues to do so. Argentina has fulfilled its second NDC, submitted its second Adaptation Communication, three national communications, and three biennial update reports. I think this is an effort that spans governments and is a very positive sign.
AJ: Is there a trend towards Argentina's role in the negotiations and its commitment to what mitigation and adaptation entail becoming, at some point, a state policy?
PB: I believe so, and the signs of recent years are very positive, especially having a National Climate Change Law and a Minimum Budget Law, which provides that institutional foundation through the governance of the National Cabinet, the Advisory Council, the National Information System, the National Adaptation and Mitigation Plan, and the provincial Response Plans. The law, very recently regulated in December, opens up a series of spaces for implementing climate policy that are very sensitive and significant, and which demonstrate this positive trend in Argentina. The question is whether this positive trend in Argentina's actions is sufficient with respect to the climate emergency and the current pace of the ecological transition.
